Standing Committee E

[Dame Marion Roe in the Chair]

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords]

Clause 12 - Application by prosecution for certain counts to be tried without a jury

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 57, in 
clause 12, page 8, line 14, leave out from beginning to 'and' in line 15.—[The Solicitor-General.] 
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

David Heath: Welcome, Dame Marion. At the end of this morning's sitting, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) was filled with a sense of gloom and despondency at the position that the Government had adopted. I share that feeling. I am disappointed that they want to reverse what was an eminently sensible amendment tabled by my noble Friends in another place.
 I am sorry to say to the Solicitor-General that I fail to be swayed by her arguments in support of a reversal. Her first argument was not entirely apposite in that she was comparing the status quo ante with the proposals under the Bill. None of us is questioning that. We accept that there is a need to tidy up the arrangements and to introduce such legislation. That is not the question. Consideration must be given to whether the amendment made in another place inserting subsection (9)(b) adds to our understanding of the Government's intention. My argument is that it does. 
 I therefore reject the second argument of the Solicitor-General, which is that such a provision at this stage will introduce a further condition on the application of the trial of a sample count. It is not a condition. Conditions under the clause are well set out under subsections (3), (4) and (5) and the judge must be satisfied that they are fulfilled under subsection (2). Subsection (9) comprises a working definition of what is meant by a sample count. It is not entirely satisfactory to say that a sample count is whatever a judge may consider it is. I have great confidence in our judiciary and I do not have any doubt that, in the main, it would interpret such matters entirely as Parliament wishes. If we are to have a definition, it should be reasonably comprehensive. That is why subsection (9)(b) should be in the clause. 
 When the matter was debated in another place, there was an interesting exchange between my noble Friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and Baroness Scotland of Asthal. My noble Friend asked her to confirm
''that a sample count is a count where all the other counts of which it is a sample could amount to similar fact, for the purposes of a trial.——[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 February 2004; Vol. 657, c. GC267.] 
The Minister gave an odd reply and said that, yes, that was the case, but it was only the case that day, and the next day it might be different. I am not sure that I followed that differentiation, because if the definition of similar fact changed—it has changed on occasion—the definition of sample count would move with that redefinition. It would be sensible to use such a proposition in the Bill. 
 As for cross-admissibility, what has been inserted seems perfectly sensible. It is interesting that there was no dissent from that on the Government's part in another place. They said that they understood that as the meaning of the clause. They asserted that that was their intention, but said that they did not want to introduce such a provision because it would bring in a new threshold—a new conditionality—to the clause. They also argued that there was a difficulty, because a judge would have to make that assessment early on, before allowing the process to continue, although he or she may not be in a position to do so. 
 I am not convinced that the argument that has been advanced today is better than that advanced when the matter was debated in the other place. Their Lordships were not convinced—they felt that this provision was sensible. Cross-admissibility determines that we are dealing with similar cases in similar circumstances in a way that narrows the scope of the provision, but not to the point of extinction; it still allows exactly what the Government want to happen, but no more than that, which is a sensible limitation. 
 To return to my point of departure, I am saddened by the Government's seeking to overturn the Lords amendment. We will oppose the Solicitor-General today, if she moves that course of action, and we will seek to reverse that omission during later stages of the Bill. We have an expectation of success in that reversal, if not in this House, then in another place. 
 If the Government are determined that this provision should not be included, they had better introduce a similar formulation to the same effect that is acceptable to them. That is the only way that they will have any chance of avoiding a sterile argument on something on which we basically agree.

Harriet Harman: We shall press forward with our amendment. In response to the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and for Beaconsfield I ask the Committee to consider the following points. Is the judicial discretion too wide, without the Government amendment, in making decisions about what is a sample case? We know that there has to be some judicial discretion, because we cannot foresee every consequence. We all agree that we cannot prescribe for the judges, who will have to consider matters case by case. The question is where the line is drawn. There is enough to make it clear to the judges what Parliament intend a sample count to be. We cannot anticipate all the different
 circumstances, but that does not mean that we have left the judges to their own devices, saying, ''Use your judicial discretion''—far from it.
 I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the three conditions set out in subsections (3), (4) and (5). 
 ''The first condition is that the number of counts included in the indictment is likely to mean that a trial by jury involving all of those counts would be impracticable.'' 
They must get over that test first; it must be impracticable to have all the counts on the same indictment. 
 ''The second condition is that, if an order under subsection (2) were made, each count or group of counts which would accordingly be tried with a jury can be regarded as a sample of counts which could accordingly be tried without a jury.'' 
It must be impracticable, a sample and 
''in the interests of justice''.

David Heath: The Solicitor-General has talked about the second condition, under which those counts to be tried
''can be regarded as a sample of counts''. 
Subsection (9) defines what a sample count is. The only qualification that she wishes to include in that definition is paragraph (c): 
''the judge considers that the sample count is a sample of the other counts.'' 
It is stated that a sample count is simply what a judge considers to be a sample count, without any qualification or any suggestion of what Parliament means by that. Is she satisfied with that?

Harriet Harman: Not entirely, I am afraid. There is a problem with subsection (9), and I will get on to that; however, we do not have the same view as the hon. Gentleman on how to solve it.
 We all agree at the outset that there must be judicial discretion; things must be done on a case-by-case basis. However, there are questions about that. Have we got enough reassurance that the judiciary know what Parliament's intention is in laying down the three conditions? First, we have the three conditions. Secondly, there is the protection of article 6 of the European convention on human rights, which states that people must have a fair trial—whatever the judge does, it must be in the context of a fair trial. Thirdly, there is rule 9 of the indictment rules. 
 The judges are not free: they have the three conditions and article 6, and if they get through those, they have to get through rule 9 of the indictment rules, which states that in order to be included on one indictment, charges must 
''be founded on the same facts, or form or are a part of a series of offences of the same or similar character.'' 
Those are the chalk marks on the ground—not that the judiciary needs them, of course. The measure is clear and narrow enough. 
 The hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Somerton and Frome also asked, ''You say that this is superfluous, so why not put it in anyway?'' Our second point has not been addressed by either of the hon. Gentlemen: it is not just superfluous, it is problematic. 
 There will be some cases that we would all agree are sample cases with the same defendant, and they would get through everything but they would fall out because there would not be cross-admissibility under the similar fact rule because the element of the probative requirement needed for that would not apply. There would be consequences that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome does not intend, and that the Government and the Serious Fraud Office would not be happy to live with. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked whether we are entirely happy with subsection (9). We will have to look at that again. If what I have said is true—which I believe it is—and it is enough to have the three conditions and article 6 and rule 9, why do we need, 
''the defendant in respect of each count is the same person''? 
That point would not be reached with different defendants. Secondly, why do we need 
''the judge considers that the sample count is a sample of the other counts''? 
Also, why not add several more measures to that effect on to the end of paragraph (c)? 
 Hon. Members are worried about the fact that we are plucking out paragraph (b) and leaving paragraphs (a) and (c). I can see that it looks as though we are being inconsistent. We will have a further discussion about why we are doing that. The principal argument is that we have got enough there. At first glance, I cannot see why we need paragraphs (a) and (c). We might have to go for the three conditions, article 6 and rule 9. If that is more clear and straightforward and focuses everybody's mind in a helpful way, it might be satisfactory to hon. Members—or even, dare I say it, to those in another place.

David Heath: I am delighted to hear what the Solicitor-General is saying, because it is precisely the point that was made by my noble Friend Lord Thomas of Gresford in another place. If we do not have a comprehensive definition, we do not need subsection (9) at all because it serves no useful purpose. If there is a proposal to delete it and replace it with some other assertion relating exactly to what the Solicitor-General has said, we may have a solution, but until we get to that point we must insist that the Bill's wording is more comprehensive and acceptable than what would be left in the Bill after the deletion.

Harriet Harman: I read the exchange between Lord Thomas and the Attorney-General in another place, but not the one between Lord Thomas and Baroness Scotland. Having said that we will look again at the clause to see whether we might take a different approach to subsection (9), I want to make it clear that we are not offering to change anything else. We are simply considering whether keeping subsection (9) is consistent with our argument for how things are supposed to be. Having a partial definition could be more problematic than standing back and examining the conditions.

Cheryl Gillan: In line with what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said, it probably would be better if subsection (9) were examined. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield will be very happy to hear of the words of the Solicitor-General when he returns to the Committee, but in the meantime, to ensure that we put down a marker and reinforce our opinion, I urge my hon. Friends to vote against the Government amendment, although I am encouraged by what the Solicitor-General says.

Harriet Harman: Hon. Members must decide for themselves how they will vote. I have explained what we will be doing. We will have discussions with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield as well as with other hon. Members who want to discuss the matter before any further changes are made. We urge the Committee to support the Government amendment.

Lady Hermon: May I raise one concern before we are forced to vote? Given the rigour of the conditions in the clause and the Solicitor-General's references to article 6 and clause 9, what confidence has she that, given the rigorous tests already in the Bill, judges will make an application on a request by the prosecution?

Harriet Harman: I think that judges will grant well-founded applications made by the prosecution if they meet the tests. Judges want the full extent of offending to be able to be taken into account on sentencing, and they know that even the offence is only one offence among 100, it is the only offence that counts for the victims, and it matters to them. Judges all remember the pre-Kidd position, so they are used to sample counts. We are not presenting judges with a completely new structure; this is about strengthening and getting right a previous practice. I urge the Committee to accept the Government amendment.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Vera Baird: I have real reservations about the clause, and I ask whether it is necessary. Although I accept that it is not a deliberate one, it is an assault on jury trial, which is the centrepiece of our democracy.
 Under the new proposal, the process starts with an appeal. The Lord Chief Justice says, ''A man has been charged on four specimen counts of 17 allegations, and he cannot be sentenced for all 17, even though they are identical to the four, because they have not been admitted, and they have not been proved. He can only be sentenced for the four on which he has been tried.'' That is going to be the rule. He said that from now on, we can sentence people only for what we have tried them on. He thought that that would not be unduly burdensome or unmanageable. 
 The Law Commission, however, thinks that there is a problem that involves hundreds of cases. The Government have accepted that position and proposed this two-stage trial procedure. The first will take place before a judge and jury in the normal way and will try the sample, or specimen, count. In the event of guilty verdict, in the second stage, the defendant will be tried by a judge alone on any charge for which the first one was a sample. It is thought that many will plead guilty at that stage. 
 Is that really necessary? There is a problem. In the case of Kidd, Lord Chief Justice Bingham determined upon that one cannot sentence on a sample basis, and one can sample only on what people have admitted or had proven against them. For many cases, it is said that, because there are so many repeat offences of a similar type, they are far too big for a jury to try. One simply cannot sentence someone for the extent of their criminality; one can perhaps pick a few cases out, and if the person has done 10 times as many crimes as that, they will not be sentenced properly. The real problem is that we are not sentencing people for their complete criminality. 
 I think Lord Chief Justice Bingham thought that the provision would not be ''unduly cumbersome'' because he thought that the problem was likely to be confined mostly to theft and fraud charges, which are most likely to remain the main area. The Law Commission accepts that, and said, at paragraph 4.18 of its report that 
''theft and fraud are likely to remain the main area in which this presents serious problems'' 
There are not likely to be a multitude of charges of sexual offences, because people's memories are too finite. 
 The other possibility, apart from theft and fraud, to which this new rule might be relevant would be the downloading of images of child pornography, which can involve a large number of charges. In the Law Commission's view, and in mine, the problem seems likely to be confined to those areas. Even in terms of downloading images of pornography the Sentencing Advisory Panel says that the numbers are not the primary basis for the sentencing—it is the course of conduct and its extent—but that they are relevant. 
 What is the problem with trying all the cases? Two references were made in the Law Commission's report: one was to a case in which there would have been 94 counts on the indictment—that is, charges on the charge sheet—and another was to a case in which there would have been 200. The SFO says that that is far too many; no jury could try that many charges fairly, and only a judge can do so. I am not sure about that. 
 My first reservation about the need for the measure is that in the Law Commission's worst case of 200 charges, there would, as I tried to say clumsily this morning, rarely be any purpose in trying all counts. We should stick to addressing theft and fraud, which are likely to be the most common matters. 
 I am not pretending for one minute that the sentences that I am about to use as examples of how things work are based on reality. If one commits a fraud of £10,000, one might be locked up for a year; if one does 10 frauds of £10,000, one does not get locked up for 10 years, but for some figure whose rate of increase diminishes as one goes further up the stage of repetition. The sentence in a fraud case involving £100,000 would probably not be significantly different from that in a case involving £700,000 or £800,000. Our anxiety must simply be to do enough; not all counts have to be tried. 
 Why is that not practical? Sentences do not increase as the numbers increase. We are talking mostly about theft and fraud. In this country, we do not sentence people guilty of such offences to very long sentences of life, 15 years, 10 years or anything like that. Rightly, we save such sentences for manslaughter, rape, violence and armed robbery. There is a finite limit on what somebody who has committed fraud or theft is likely to get, so we do not need to try them on all counts. Trying the last 50 of 200 counts would probably not change the sentence at all. We need to be able just to try enough charges. 
 What is the difficulty with that? We could sever an indictment: that is, cut a trial into bits. We could swear in successive juries to try them successively. That may sound long winded, and it may be, but what is the problem? I have been in cases of a different kind that were just as long winded. For instance, in the Orgreave trial during the miners' strike, more than 200 men were tried for riot, affray and other offences committed on a field near Sheffield. The first trial was going to involve 15 men to make it manageable. Some 200 people were involved; how many trials would taking 15 at a time mean? A lot. 
 The law and the courts still contemplate doing exactly that, and they have done so with every prison riot. There are simply successive trials, tried by juries. There may be a fear of inconsistent verdicts between jury A and jury B, but there could be inconsistent verdicts between judge A and judge B. The same judge will not necessarily try all cases. There might be inconsistent verdicts between the jury who try a sample and a judge who tries the cases that follow. I see no difficulty, once one realises that the scale of offences covered is likely to involve theft and fraud. The 
 important thing is that trying more and more offences involves the law of diminishing returns, unlike simply splitting them up and trying them. 
 I would have thought that part of the problem of bulk in trials had been solved successfully by section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allows the admission of evidence of the defendant's bad character—that is to say, evidence of a person's conviction—during criminal proceedings. For instance, in a first trial on 15 counts of theft and fraud, a jury may convict a man on 15, 14, 13 or however many counts, and therefore show that he has behaved dishonestly. The test would be whether we could put in that conviction, showing his bad character. The answer would come under section 101(1)(d) of the 2003 Act if 
''it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution''. 
The case would be about dishonesty. The man in question would say that he had not been dishonest in relation to the transactions being examined in trial number 2; he would say that they were accidents, mistakes or flaws in his inadequate bookkeeping. Calling evidence that he had been convicted of dishonesty just before on related counts would be directly relevant to an important matter in issue between the defence and prosecution. With that power, brought in by the Government and directly applicable, there would be a great many pleas after the first trial as well. If there are pleas, the issues will be relatively easy for a jury to resolve. 
 What is the need for this provision, and what are the dangers? During the past few years, there has been a series of attempts to limit jury trial. Although I accept that this is not one such attempt, the provision is essentially about theft and serious fraud, which was one of the moves thwarted last time. However, it is now clear that the Government say that the clause is not an assault on jury trial, and that if anything goes wrong with the rest of jury trial because of it, that will be a result of the law of unintended consequences.

David Heath: The hon. and learned Lady might remember that we were left in a slightly unsatisfactory position at the end of proceedings on the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Opposition made a stalwart defence of jury trial for complex cases and certainly won, but only in the sense that the Government's proposals were not implemented; however, they remain in the Act. We were assured that we would have further discussions with the Home Secretary and others on what the next steps would be, but those have not yet materialised. Is she surprised that there has been no discussion of those matters?

Vera Baird: I do not know about that. I would have thought that there would be need for discussion only if there were any prospect of implementing the measures. Perhaps that is simply not yet being considered. I do not know why, or whether it has anything to do with the provisions in the Bill. However, I do not want to go down that road because I have been assured that the proposals are not being brought in.
 I now turn to what I accept will be the unintended consequences of the measures. If there was a two-tier system of trial, people would soon be singing the praises of trial by judge alone: there is no doubt that it is cheaper and quicker than full-blown jury trial. I ask hon. Members to think about that. If I am in court doing an advocacy job in front of 12 people who cannot speak to me at all, I have to go at the presumed rate of the slowest member of the jury. They do not know the first thing about the law, so I have to explain everything that I am doing in great detail. A judge, on the other hand, could say, ''Yes, I've got that point, Mrs. Baird; do get on with it,'' and I would know that the judge knew the law. The process would therefore be much quicker and cheaper than jury trial. 
 People might say, ''This is odd. Why do we need a jury to take three weeks to try 10 of the counts when the judge has taken only a fortnight to try to the other 190? Obviously, we should scrap juries completely and get on with trials by judge alone. We are wasting a lot of public money.'' The move is not necessary, for the reasons that I gave. My fear is that it will, unintentionally, be the beginning of the end for jury trial.

Harriet Harman: It might assist the Committee if during this stand part debate I deal with clauses 13 to 16, which relate to the procedures underlying clause 12. If you feel that that is not helpful, Dame Marion, you could cut in and say that you had heard quite enough. In that way, we might not need stand part debates on the other clauses. Looking into the procedure and the substance of the clauses might be helpful, so I shall address matters in that way.
 My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) has made her case forcefully. I am sure that everyone on the Committee, including you, Dame Marion, thinks that she would make a jolly good Solicitor-General. However, on this occasion I disagree with her. She says that the measure is an assault on jury trial, but she agrees that no cases will be tried under the second stage of the two-part procedure—that is, by a judge on his own—that would have been tried by a jury in the pre-Kidd days. To that extent, there is no reduction in jury trial; therefore the measure is not an assault on jury trial. It simply regulates the situation that pertained before the Kidd decision in the Court of Appeal. 
 My hon. and learned Friend's second point was whether one could not simply have ''enough'' counts on the indictment. I have a problem with that; one should have the full extent of the offending on the indictment. I am a bit uncomfortable about slicing through the indictment and leaving the other offending to one side. I know what she means when she says that sentencing is not cumulative—the sentence does not go up in exact proportion to the sum involved. Otherwise, people would be convicted and sentenced to hundreds of years. I take the point that there is no mathematical accumulator, but it is important and right that the court has before it the full extent of the offending and that is on the indictment. 
 My hon. and learned Friend's argument about doing enough for sentencing does not take account of the fact that we need to know the full extent of the criminality on the indictment; nor does it take into account the question of the multiple victims in the cases. Each of the counts will represent a separate victim. In continuous offences that are tried by sample, there is only one victim, but a whole load of victims would just be pushed out of the picture by what my hon. and learned Friend suggests. 
 My hon. and learned Friend said that people will soon say, ''Let's not have juries any more. Let's just have trial by judge alone.'' She knows as well as I do that people say that all the time; it is an ongoing argument. That does not help us decide whether this is the right procedure. What somebody might argue in future is not a good argument for not supporting this clause. 
 As hon. Members have said, the provisions have their provenance in a Law Commission report that considered the problems that arise in cases in which the offending conduct of the defendant is repeated so many times that there are too many individual offences to be accommodated in a single jury trial. The report and its recommendations address a specific situation that is widely acknowledged to be highly unsatisfactory. In the past, such cases could be dealt with by means of a specimen count to ensure that the trial will be manageable for a jury. Upon conviction, the judge would sentence on the basis that the counts upon which the defendant had been found guilty were samples of the much larger number of offences committed. The defendant would thus be sentenced to a term commensurate with the totality of the offending. The 1998 Court of Appeal decision in Kidd and others precluded such an approach: the Court ruled that the practice of sentencing on the basis of specimen counts was inconsistent with the principle that a defendant should be sentenced for offences that have been proved by verdict, or to which he has pleaded guilty, or which he has agreed to have taken into consideration. The problem with specimen counts, therefore, was that the defendant was sentenced on the basis of offences to which he had not pleaded guilty or which had not been proved guilty by verdict. 
 That decision, although correct in principle, has given rise to a serious problem in certain cases of multiple offending. In those cases, the consequences of the impracticality of prosecuting the full extent of offending and the prohibition on specimen counts are that the vast majority of such offending is not prosecuted. The offender thus escapes appropriate sanction. That is a serious failing in the system. Defendants should not escape just punishment because court procedures cannot accommodate the volume of their offending. The court needs to have before it the full extent of the offending. 
 The Law Commission's recommendation for a two-stage trial procedure in the Crown Court seeks to address those problems. The scheme is aimed at allegations of multiple offending that do not fall into the category of a continuous offence—generally 
 because they are committed against a series of victims rather than only one and involve repeated similar offending. In terms of type of offence, we expect the scheme to operate chiefly in the areas of theft and fraud, in which the total sum is relevant to the sentence. At present, a person whose offending involves the commission of hundreds of offences, each involving a small amount, perhaps, but the overall gain of which might be considerable, cannot be sentenced to a term that reflects the true extent of their offending. That cannot be right. Confiscation of proceeds questions must also be taken into account. 
 The outline of the procedure is dealt with in subsequent clauses. The key elements of the procedure are as follows. The prosecution makes an application for the two-stage trial procedure to be invoked. The application is considered by the trial judge at a preparatory hearing. In the event of a successful application, an indictment is drawn up containing charges chosen to show samples of the offending. A series of linked offences, reflecting the full extent of the alleged offending, is placed in a schedule attached to the indictment. 
 The first stage of the trial is a conventional jury trial on the sample counts contained in the indictment. The second stage takes place only in the event of a guilty verdict on one or more of the counts tried before the jury. The judge alone decides on the guilt or innocence of the defendant in respect only of offences linked to those upon which the jury has convicted. The judge is not bound by the conviction of the jury at stage one but is free to come to his or her own view of the evidence. In the event that the jury has acquitted on a sample count, there is a presumption in favour of a directed acquittal on the linked counts. The defence has a right of appeal against an order for a two-stage trial, and the judge is required to give a reasoned verdict at the end of the second stage in the event of a conviction. 
 The two-stage procedure will have a number of benefits. It will preserve jury trial in respect of the core examples of the defendant's criminality. It will ensure that the jury trial is manageable and comprehensible. It will be likely to encourage guilty defendants, either on an initial arraignment or after conviction of a number of sample offences, to plead guilty to or to admit any linked offences of which they are also guilty. It will give the defendant a fair hearing, with the opportunity to present a defence in relation to any or all of the alleged offences. It will ensure that defendants will not be able to take advantage of the practical limits of trial by jury so as to go unpunished for a significant part of their offending. It will allow the court to sentence the defendant for the full extent of his or her offending while safeguarding a fundamental requirement of justice: that the defendant is sentenced only for offences that have been proved to a court after a trial, or to which they have admitted. 
 The two-stage procedure will also allow full expression of each of two fundamental requirements of justice: first, that a defendant should be sentenced 
 only for offences that are admitted or of which the defendant has been convicted after having had the opportunity to challenge the evidence; secondly, that defendants should be tried and sentenced for the full extent of their criminality. I would add a third requirement: that justice be done in respect of each person who is a victim of that criminality. The defendant will be given a fair hearing, with an opportunity to present a defence in relation to any or all of the alleged offences. The procedures thus safeguard the interests of the defendant by ensuring that the sentence will reflect that conduct which the prosecution has proved to the jury and, thereafter, to the judge. 
 I understand colleagues sense that when things are separated out like this, in the manner that the Law Commission has proposed, it looks uncomfortably as though the second counts will somehow be second-class justice, but that is not what will happen. That is not what happened pre-Kidd. Our proposal is an improvement on the pre-Kidd procedure. There will be sufficient safeguards, transparency in practice, rights of appeal and judicial discretion. Clauses 12 to 16 should stand part of the Bill. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 13 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 - Modification of sections 12 to 15 for Northern Ireland

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 61, in schedule 1, page 23, line 20, leave out from beginning to the second 'that' in line 23 and insert
'the requirement under Article 49A of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 62, 64, 67, 68, 58 and 59.
 Government new clause 20—Procedure for determining fitness to plead: England and Wales. 
 Government new clause 21—Procedure for determining fitness to be tried: Northern Ireland.

Paul Goggins: The amendments would reintroduce procedural changes for determining fitness to plead under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 that were removed from the Bill in the other place.
 New clause 20 introduces the central change. The decision on whether the defendant is fit to be tried is to be taken 
''by the court without a jury''. 
That replaces the current requirement that a jury take that decision. The change was a recommendation of Lord Justice Auld. It is designed to streamline the current cumbersome process whereby separate juries 
 have to decide, first, whether the defendant is to be tried and, secondly, whether he did the act or made the admission as charged. 
 New clause 21 does the same in respect of Northern Ireland. Lord Justice Auld's remit did not include Northern Ireland. However, the proposed measure has attracted equally strong judicial support there and the Government wish to extend the provision to Northern Ireland as we think that it will be of equal value there as it will be in England and Wales. 
 The measure will improve the court process, but I wish to examine the issue from the point of view of the defendants. I believe that it will have some added protection for them in two ways. First, such defendants are often vulnerable, and if the judge were to make the determination, they would not have to go before the jury on two separate occasions. The judge would determine fitness to plead and a jury would then be convened to determine whether the defendants did the acts as charged. It is important to stress that we do not consider the provision to be an erosion of the right to trial by jury. A defendant cannot be sent directly to hospital if he is found unfit to plead. The result of a finding of unfitness to plead is that the trial of criminal liability stops, but the jury is still convened to engage in a fact-finding exercise. The defendant can be sent compulsorily to hospital only if he is found unfit to plead and a jury finds that he did the act with which he was charged.

Lady Hermon: I am sorry to interrupt the Minister in full flow. I am pleased that the provisions will be extended to Northern Ireland. He said that these defendants are vulnerable. I could not agree with him more. Perhaps I am wrong, but am I right in thinking that the provisions do not apply to youth courts? We are discussing vulnerable young people, but the provisions apply only to people over 18.

Paul Goggins: I am sure that advice on that will be with me soon. Perhaps I can clarify the position with the hon. Lady later in the debate. I am pleased that she welcomes the extension of the provisions to Northern Ireland.
 As I said, the defendant can be sent compulsorily to hospital only if he is found unfit to plead and a jury finds that he did the act with which he was charged, so a person who is found unfit to plead by the judge will still have a jury to decide on the facts of his case. If the jury decides that he did not do the act with which he was charged, it must return a verdict of acquittal as it would if the case had proceeded to trial. In that case, the defendant walks out of the court completely free. 
 It is rare for medical evidence of fitness to be contested. In the first five years of the operation of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, evidence on fitness was challenged in only 10 per cent. of cases in which it was submitted. Frankly, it erodes the significance of the jury system for juries to be required to rubber-stamp what is often technical and professional evidence. 
 The second way in which the measure benefits the defendant is in relation to what happens if he disagrees with the decision that he is unfit to plead. If he disagrees, he is far better served by a judge making that decision, not a jury. The judge will have to give reasons for his or her decision, which will be open to challenge on appeal. Those reasons will be available to a defendant wishing to go to the Court of Appeal, but no reasons are given when a jury makes the decision. The proposal for the judge to make the decision puts the defendant in a more favourable position in the event of an appeal. 
 The remainder of the amendments in the group are consequential, applying mainly to Northern Ireland, to reflect the change of responsibility for determining fitness to plead. I realise that the matter caused some controversy in the other place, but I hope that the Committee will be reassured that the proposals are positive. First, they will not undermine the right to trial by jury; secondly, they simplify the court process; and thirdly, they strengthen the rights of defendants who may also be vulnerable. On those grounds, I hope that the measures will be included in the Bill.

Cheryl Gillan: I appreciate what the Under-Secretary was doing when reinstating the provisions removed with a reasonable majority in the other place by my noble Friends, together with Liberal Democrat Lords. I hope that, despite what he said, I will persuade him to think again. As he rightly said, the amendments effectively remove from the ambit of a jury the decision on whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, and award it solely to a judge.
 The provisions will extend to Northern Ireland; the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) has already welcomed them. In debating other amendments, we will see how they apply to courts martial, too. 
 I have reflected on the debates in the other place, but I still think that despite the distinguished provenance of this proposal, to which the Under-Secretary referred—it is contained in Lord Justice Auld's report—there is a perception that the Government are removing more decision making from the lay members who contribute to the judicial process and concentrating it in the hands of legal professionals. In addition, the Bill effectively consigns the defendant to what could be incarceration in a mental institution without the benefit of their case being heard by a jury. That could also become an issue of civil liberties. 
 On reconsidering Lord Justice Auld's report, which is a lengthy and weighty tome that could prop open doors, I found that it devotes two paragraphs—barely a page—to requiring a judge alone to determine fitness to plead. Baroness Scotland of Asthal deployed only a minimal set of arguments to justify the change, hence my concern with the arguments in the other place. First, she argued that it was a waste of time and resources to convene two juries if a defendant's fitness to plead is being considered. That argument was not promoted by Lord Justice Auld in his two paragraphs. 
 If, at the end of the process, the defendant is deprived of his or her liberty, they will not be impressed that they did not have the opportunity for 
 their voice to be heard because the process cost too much or was too complicated. I appreciate that there is more flexibility in dealing with a defendant who is found to be unfit to plead with regard to an absolute discharge to hospital order, but he or she still loses access to an institution that commands public confidence during a process that could eventually take away his or her liberty. I also appreciate that the Under-Secretary said that there is an added protection for vulnerable people, but that may be afforded by a jury process in which the offender would have more confidence. 
 On resources, I am not sure that we will run out of people to serve on juries. There are plenty of people hanging around courts who could be put on juries. It is a question of opportunity costs. There are bodies in the court system that can be used in this process. 
 Baroness Scotland argued that a jury is unlikely to be as well qualified as a judge to interpret complex professional evidence. However, on closer examination that argument does stand up. I am not sure that the judge has any special qualities to bring to the process. The jury would be taking evidence from two medical practitioners, at least one of whom would be approved for the purpose of presenting evidence in such cases. It is, therefore, likely that the jury would be hearing evidence from professionals who are well placed to interpret the medical histories and conditions involved and to express their interpretation in a way that a jury can understand. 
 Judges and practitioners alike recognise that juries get it right. I doubt if the Under-Secretary can give me a long list of cases where the jury got it wrong over fitness to plead, or if he can produce a list of cases at all. If he can, I should be pleased to see it. 
 Lord Justice Auld acknowledged that the jury's role in unfitness to plead cases is often nothing short of a formality. The Under-Secretary alluded to that. There is usually no difference of opinion between the prosecution and the defence about the state of mind of the defendant. If that role is removed as an option, we will erode yet further what is still viewed, and what the hon. and learned Member for Redcar referred to, as a cornerstone of British justice that is there for the benefit of the British citizen. As it is, only about 1 per cent. of criminal cases in England and Wales culminate in trial by jury. If juries lose their role in cases of fitness to plead, we are certainly contributing to the demise of the jury system. 
 In the past five years, how many juries have sat to consider fitness to plead? Have there been any recorded complaints from defendants saying that the process was flawed? What estimates have been made of costs or savings to the public purse resulting from the difference between jury decisions and the decisions of judges sitting on their own? I do not believe that that was mentioned in the impact assessment, although perhaps it was there and I missed it. 
 By statute, under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, the issue must be determined by a jury, either on arraignment or, if the court so decides, at any time 
 during the trial until the opening of the defence. Can the Minister reassure me that that would still be the case if the clauses came into operation? 
 I have tried to put the case for reconsidering the amendments. I hope that the Minister will not overturn the judgment made in another place, and that he will withdraw the amendments.

David Heath: Previously, we debated an amendment tabled by my noble Friends in another place and supported by the Conservatives. In this instance, we are debating the replacement of something that was taken out as a response to an amendment by the Conservatives in another place and supported by my noble Friends. I do not think that we differ in our reasoning in this matter.
 First, I welcome the application of the law to Northern Ireland. I do not welcome what is being done, but I believe in consistency; if one is determined to be wrong in England and Wales, then one may as well be wrong in Northern Ireland, too. That is a fundamental principle, and I am glad that the Government have finally accepted that. 
 However, the Government have got things wrong here. I am always slightly concerned when I hear Ministers quoting Lord Justice Auld's report or the Law Commission report, because the Government had no compunction about rejecting so much of what both reports said and then plucking a sentence or two and using the reports as a flag of convenience to justify what they are doing. I take with a pinch of salt the assertion that all that the Government are doing is what is arrived at by consensus, and what is a self-evident truth because it is in the Auld report. 
 I also have concerns—and the amendments are not the worst example of this by a long way—that one of the Home Office's priorities in recent years has been the chipping away at the role of the lay person in our judicial system. Whenever a lay person is involved, one can be sure that the Government will soon come up with a good reason why they should no longer be involved, and why the job should be left to the professionals, whether that be the judiciary or others. I do not accept that, because it is a cardinal principle of our law that the lay person is an integral part of the procedure. We are discussing a fairly marginal application of that principle, because, as has been said, by and large there will not be a contest about the medical advice proffered to a court. Very often, there is a view as to whether a person is unfit to plead. However, where there is a difference of medical expert opinion, the right tribunal for determining which opinion should be accepted must be the jury, not a judge. 
 A judge is not qualified to take a medical view. As the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) said, we may be dealing with incarceration of a person on a decision taken—if the Government have their way—by one judge. That judge will decide which of two equally valid, but differing, medical opinions he chooses to adopt. I prefer that decision to be in the hands of a jury. Our noble Friends in another place 
 were right to support the amendment that removed the provision. The Government are wrong to bring it back at this stage. The advantages are minimal, the potential disbenefit substantial, and I hope that the Government will think again. We will oppose the amendment.

Paul Goggins: Let me begin by responding to the question asked earlier by the hon. Member for North Down about the applicability of the measures to young people. I confirm that they will apply only to the Crown court, so they will apply to young people under the age of 18 who are before the Crown court. However, such persons would be there only if the charge was serious—we do not expect children to appear frequently at the Crown court. I hope that I have given some clarification.
 I say to the hon. Members for Chesham and Amersham and for Somerton and Frome that any Government proposal that contains a suggestion of transferring responsibilities and decision making from juries to judges will be challenged and scrutinised. I accept that. It is an important part of our judicial system and we need to protect it. I well understand why people raise such issues. However, I emphasise that we are discussing not trial by jury, but determination of fitness to plead. The case in relation to fitness to plead is a technical and professional judgment that is currently put to the jury. We are suggesting that it be put to the judge. 
 As I said, the evidence is challenged only in some 10 per cent. of cases. I do not argue that the jury does not have the ability to understand such arguments. I reject any suggestion that ordinary men and women who are members of a jury are not capable of understanding the issues. However, my fellow Home Office Ministers want to make sure that we treat juries as an important and significant resource. Our argument is that we would not be making best use of that precious resource and time by putting them through a technical process that is rarely challenged.

Cheryl Gillan: Let us consider a high-profile case that stirred much emotion among the general public. Does the Minister accept that it would be more difficult to explain the exclusion of the jury from that part of the proceedings? Public interest in high-profile cases will be more satisfied if fitness to plead was dealt with by a jury of the people, not by a judge sitting behind closed doors. The amendments will be perceived outside the Committee as an erosion. The Minister is removing an important part of the process in which reasonable men and women are seen to participate in something that might be of great public interest.

Paul Goggins: I understand the hon. Lady's concern, but we have an important responsibility to educate the public more about the procedures within courts. The jury does not decide off the top of its head whether someone is fit to plead; it makes a decision based on technical and professional evidence that is given to it—evidence that is challenged in only 10 per cent. of cases. Members of the jury do not just make it up; they listen to the technical and professional evidence. We argue that if that evidence were put
 directly to the judge, jury time could be used better. That benefits the defendant because the judge would have to list reasons for his decision, which would be challengeable in the Court of Appeal.
 On the numbers that the hon. Lady requested, the Department for Constitutional Affairs does not keep figures for juries that have been convened to determine was fitness to plead. We do have figures for cases in which a person was found unfit to plead, and I will write to the hon. Lady and other Committee members with those figures. As for her final question, fitness to plead will still be able to be considered at any time until the opening of the defence. We are not changing that procedure at all. We want to change the person or persons who make the decision, not the procedure.

Vera Baird: It is a complete waste of resources if both psychiatrists—sometimes, there are even three or four—agree on a opinion, but the law requires a jury to be sworn in to decide the uncontested issue. Would it not better to alter the law to allow the judge to rubber-stamp on those occasions but to keep juries for the 10 per cent. of cases that are contested?

Paul Goggins: As always, my hon. and learned Friend makes an interesting suggestion, although not one to which the Government feel attracted. We must make a balanced judgment between the evidence that professional people give to the court and the sensible use of the jury's time and the effective use of resources. In drawing that balance, we have decided that in all cases the decision should be transferred.

Cheryl Gillan: I have heard what the Minister has said, but, with other Opposition Members, I remain unsatisfied. For the record, I would like to give notice that when the Committee comes to decide on Government new clause 20, which will be the indicative vote, we will seek to divide the Committee.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 17 - Powers of court on finding of insanity or unfitness to plead etc

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 102, in page 12, line 17, at end insert—
 '(4) Section 5A of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (''the 1964 Act'') applies in relation to this section as it applies in relation to section 5 of that Act.
 (5) Where the Court of Appeal make an interim hospital order by virtue of this section—
(a) the power of renewing or terminating it and of dealing with the appellant on its termination shall be exercisable by the court below and not by the Court of Appeal; and
(b) the court below shall be treated for the purposes of section 38(7) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (absconding offenders) as the court that made the order.
 (6) Where the Court of Appeal make a supervision order by virtue of this section, any power of revoking or amending it shall be exercisable as if the order had been made by the court below.'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 103, 104, 106, 63, 107 to 122, and 105
 Government new clause 38—Courts-martial etc. 
 Government new schedule 1—Unfitness to stand trial and insanity: courts-martial etc.

Paul Goggins: This rather large group of amendments is intended to reflect in court martial proceedings the changes that were made in clauses 17 and 18. It also reflects the change made by new clauses 20 and 21, so that a decision on whether a defendant is fit to plead will be made by the judge advocate alone, rather than by the lay members of the court martial.
 The service legislation in this respect is out of date. An attempt to provide an updated framework was made in the Armed Forces Act 1996, but the regulatory framework that it provided for has proved too complex and has never been commenced. It is therefore a matter of some urgency to put appropriate provisions in place. 
 The effect of the amendments is to allow courts martial to slot into the Mental Health Act 1983 and to make hospital orders on the same terms as civilian courts. That means abandoning the Armed Forces Act 1996 provisions, which envisaged a system allowing courts martial to commit people to hospital in Scotland or Northern Ireland, as well as in England and Wales. It must be emphasised however that, under the new provisions, a person who is admitted to hospital in England and Wales can later be administratively transferred to a hospital elsewhere in the United Kingdom, if that is appropriate in their case. 
 The amendments also address a problem with service legislation that has only become apparent recently in House of Lords and European Court of Human Rights case law. The Armed Forces Act 1996 envisages that orders admitting people to hospital or non-residential supervision would be made with input from both the judge advocate—who is a civilian judge—and the lay members of the court martial, who are non-legally qualified military officers who serve a function like a jury. That is consistent with the normal court martial sentencing procedure, which allows the lay members to have input into sentencing because of their expert knowledge about the effect of criminal offending on military discipline. However, the case law makes it clear that those orders are to be considered not as criminal in nature, but as mental health matters. Although the court members will still decide on the facts of the case, it is inappropriate to have lay input into the orders themselves. The decision should be made by the judge alone, on the basis of advice from mental health professionals. 
 In addition, amendments Nos. 102 to 104 make some technical improvements to clause 17. The changes are not related to the court martial system, but simply improve what we have already done for the civilian system.

David Heath: If an individual is committed to a hospital by a court martial, does that individual remain under military discipline and subject to Queen's regulations?

Paul Goggins: My understanding is that they do not remain under military discipline. If any further details are of interest to the hon. Gentleman, I will write to him about them.
 The amendments are large in number, but I hope that they are not too controversial.

Cheryl Gillan: I am grateful for the succinct way in which the Minister has explained this large group of amendments, but fear strikes my heart when I read that the unfitness to plead provisions were out of date and that schedule 2 of the Armed Forces Act 1996 was never commenced due to its complexity. That is reflected in the large number of Government amendments that face us now. It is a minefield to try to make sense of such a large group.
 The Minister tells us that in an attempt to bring the military sphere into line with civilian legislation, he has chosen to remove from the equation the two lay members who sit with the judge advocate. The arguments used to justify removing the jury process in non-military courts cannot be read across, because we are not talking here about a cumbersome or an arduous process or unnecessarily long procedures. 
 It would be interesting to know how many cases the provisions could apply to in the armed services and how many instances of cases of unfitness to plead there have been in the past five years. It is to be hoped that military procedures identify servicemen and women who have a severe mental health problem at an early stage, long before things came to a court martial. The statistics on that would inform the Committee. 
 What consultations has the Minister had with the armed services and their personnel? It would be interesting to know whether the military fully back the changes, and what problems, if any, were raised. There are intrinsically different sets of procedures for the armed services and for the civilian courts. 
 It would also be interesting to know what was behind the presence of the two lay assessors in the first place, because to remove them from the equation is quite a step forward. I find it hard to imagine how removing the two military personnel from the panel and leaving an outside judge advocate to sit on their own will benefit the offender. I also wonder whether we could find out what other European countries do in their courts martial, and whether there is any thinking in the Home Office about bringing our armed services procedures into line with procedures in Europe. 
 Will there be any savings? I am not sure what arrangements are made for people sitting on courts martial. It appears that there are only opportunity costs. It would be interesting to know what impact assessment studies have been done on these provisions. 
 As I understand it, we have an extraordinary law for our armed services, which are extraordinary services. For example, there is a military offence of cowardice 
 that does not read across into the civilian system. I cannot understand why we are interfering in the process of courts martial, which appear to be functioning well. Further, I would like to know why we are removing, in effect, the military presence in courts martial. That is like imagining a Church court without bishops. A court martial without representatives of the armed services seems a contradiction in terms. 
 What is the position when our armed forces are elsewhere in the world? During the passage of the Armed Forces Discipline Bill in 1999, Lord Burnham summed up our concerns: 
 ''What may be acceptable in the garrison towns of Colchester and Aldershot may not be practicable or in the least possible at the sharp end in East Timor or Kosovo.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 29 November 1999; Vol. 523, c. 672.] 
What would happen if the situation arose when our armed servicemen were abroad on their duties?

Paul Goggins: The hon. Lady asked a number of questions. I will attempt to answer them all, but I think that I will fail. I will write to her on any detailed questions that I am unable to answer now.
 The costs will be minimal; the numbers are small. One reason for that is that we have not been able, as the hon. Lady pointed out, to bring the 1996 Act into play, so we have not been able to do the things that we want. I emphasise the importance of what she said: prevention and early action, rather than letting things run and have negative consequences, is always to be preferred. 
 She asked about lay members. I am not sure when they were introduced, but their role is clear: to bring their understanding of the impact of offending to military discipline and to make sure that that is understood at the point of sentence. 
 The hon. Lady asked about consultation between my Department and the Ministry of Defence and consultation with the armed forces. There has been a great deal of consultation, and all the measures that we propose in this vast number of amendments are fully supported by the armed services. I hope that, with that reassurance, the hon. Lady will be inclined to support the Government's amendments. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 103, in clause 17, page 12, line 20, at end insert 
'''interim hospital order'' has the meaning given in section 38 of that Act;'. 
No. 104, in clause 17, page 12, line 24, leave out from first 'the' to end of line 27 and insert '1964 Act.'''. Paul Goggins.] 
 Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 18 - Appeal against order made on finding of insanity or unfitness to plead etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: In light of the previous debate, may I ask simply how the right of appeal operates in a court martial?

Paul Goggins: I emphasised that there was good collaboration between the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office and close consultation on this matter. However, there is no point in my pretending that I can answer the hon. Gentleman's question at this stage in terms of the technical detail that he requires. I undertake to seek further advice and to confirm that the arrangements are precisely the same as those in the civilian world. I hope that that satisfies him.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 19 and 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 21 - Code of practice for victims

Cheryl Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in clause 21, page 14, line 27, at end insert—
 '(5A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (5) the code shall set out provisions to exempt victims of domestic violence and their dependants who are subject to immigration control from any proceedings that may alter their immigration status until such time as the Secretary of State is satisfied no domestic violence, or threat of violence has occurred, or is likely to occur whether or not any criminal proceedings have taken place or are likely to take place with respect to that domestic violence or threat of violence.'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 36, in clause 33, page 19, line 30, at end add— 
 '(3) The Secretary of State may exempt victims of domestic violence and their dependants who are subject to immigration control from the restriction on public funds to enable them to access emergency accommodation and living costs, and may recover such funds from the sponsor (as defined by section 113 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999) of the victim.'. 
New clause 14—Effect of immigration rules— 
 'The Commissioner shall have regard to the effect of the Immigration Rules on victims of domestic violence.'.

Cheryl Gillan: The clause is the enabling clause for the code of practice for victims, and we welcome this step forward in the way in which we deal with victims.
 Amendment No. 13 is simply inspired by the plight of many people, the majority of whom, by far, are women, who come to this country to join their family or to get married and who are then subject to violence. I acknowledge that the Government have offered them protection to a certain degree by quite sensibly applying the new domestic violence rule to the immigration rules. I understand that if a woman can show that her marriage to a British citizen or to an individual who has settled in this country broke down because of domestic violence during her two-year probationary period but before she has indefinite leave to remain, she may be granted settlement. That has 
 regularised a situation and shows the humanity with which we can treat women who find themselves in those circumstances. 
 However, there remains a group of women who are over their two-year probationary period—they are commonly referred to as overstayers—and who do not have the protection of settlement open to them that is afforded by the application of the domestic violence rule. They are usually entirely dependent upon their spouse to regularise their situation and if he is abusive, they remain trapped, because the alternative, as they see it, could be deportation or worse. Their overstay is not their fault, as it is not in their control, and an abusive spouse can hold it over the head of the women as a controlling factor. If a woman is unable to access help or advice when her visa expires and her two-year probationary period is up, she is entirely at the abuser's mercy. 
 I have been particularly impressed, as I believe that the Minister and other Committee members have, by the Southall Black Sisters, who have highlighted this and other issues. I am sure that it will seek to persuade the Minister of the changes that it wants and I know that it has held meetings with Committee members in an attempt to do so. 
 I also appreciate that while considering this matter we should ensure that any provision cannot be abused, whereby parties agree to rely on a defence of domestic violence to secure settlement. That should not put us off considering amendment No. 13. I appreciate that it might not find favour with the Minister but if he cannot agree to it, I would ask him to undertake to address the issue and to provide a solution that the Government would find acceptable. It is not right that in 2004 we should consign a group of black and minority women to live in fear and trepidation. I look forward to hearing his views on the amendment.

Sandra Gidley: Amendment No. 36 is intended to achieve the same ends in a slightly differently way. I share the sentiments of the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham on the work of Southall Black Sisters, which has been active on this issue and persuaded several hundred organisations to back the campaign to amend the law.
 It is easy to underestimate the impact of domestic violence on some women. One big problem is that often if someone is new to a country, newly married, does not understand the language well and is relying on their partner to sponsor them for money, they have nowhere to go if domestic violence is happening. It is even worse than that in some respects. There are well-documented cases where women have tried to go to the police, but with nowhere safe to go they have been forced to return to their violent partner and withdraw their allegations. 
 Sometimes we forget that there are children to consider. Although some women want to leave a partner and return home, because not everybody wants to stay in this country—we often ignore that 
 part of the argument—that is not an easy option for others who face hardship and being ostracised socially on their return. 
 It is useful to think about the scale of the problem. According to the work done by Southall Black Sisters, which deals with or becomes aware of the bulk of the problem, about 500 to 600 women a year have no recourse to public funds. Some 90 per cent. of those women have sponsors from whom, if the amendment were accepted, the Government would perhaps be able to regain some money. That problem is set against the 44,000 spouses a year who are granted settlement. Between 2000 and 2002 only 119 women applied for indefinite leave to remain under the domestic violence concession. It is not enough for the Government to say, ''We have the domestic violence concession, which women can use.'' It is clearly not being used to its full capacity. If the Government think that this measure is the way forward, I would welcome any suggestions as to how we can make it more effective. However, if it is only reaching about a quarter of the women who are affected, it is not ideal and needs to be reviewed. 
 Similar amendments were opposed in the other place. The reason given was that they undermined the integrity of the immigration and benefits rules. The Government confirmed their commitment to addressing the problem. I shall return to some of the Government action later, because there is not another convenient place to raise some of the questions. 
 It has been argued that this is a human rights issue. Failure to protect all women who are subject to immigration control from domestic violence, and withholding public funds from victims because of their uncertain status, is discriminatory, disproportionate and a violation of human rights. Why should the abuser not be more accountable? To deny women access to public funds in this relatively small number of cases has meant that some who have reported abusers to the police have often been left with no option but to withdraw their allegations. Unfortunately, we are sending a message that says, ''It's okay to do this, we're not going to come after you.'' The Government are seeking to address other aspects of the law, but this situation sends a message to a certain section of the community. 
 The amendments would protect all victims of domestic violence who are subject to immigration controls as defined under section 159 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. That includes the spouses and married partners of persons with British citizenship or indefinite leave to remain. Since April 2003, things have gotten slightly worse: before then a relationship had to endure one year, but the period was increased to two years. As we have already been made aware, pregnancy is often a precipitating factor for domestic violence; with a two-year period, there is a much greater chance of that happening. 
 Other people who will be included are overstayers. It is important to be aware that some women are not kept up to date about their immigration status by their spouse. I am dealing with a case at the moment in which the spouse opens all the mail, so the woman 
 simply does not know what is going on. These things happen. The provisions will cover many other categories of person, as well. 
 Will the Minister explain why there seems to be no willingness to extend the domestic violence provision? Although I have highlighted the problems, why it is acceptable only for certain categories of women to claim the provision as a reason to stay. If the provision could be tightened up and extended to other groups of women, it would create a lot of reassurance. 
 I am not yet sure what solutions the Government propose. I hope that the Minister will take some time to clarify what is happening. In ''Safety and Justice'', the Government made a commitment to ensuring that victims can get access to safety and support, including refuge services funded through the ''Supporting People'' arrangements. The problem with the latter is that they cover only the non-housing aspects of support. Although there is some support available, relying on that provision neglects the very real problem that women have in accessing some sort of housing. Most refuges use housing grants to fund places, and housing grants are the one thing not available to women in that position. In its summary of responses to ''Safety and Justice'', the Home Office makes a commitment to ensuring that those who are still subject to immigration control can get access to refuge and accommodation, but the Home Office figures show a severe shortfall in provision of support and services to ethnic minority women. 
 I am aware that some £40,000 has been given to the Women's Aid last resort fund; that is very welcome, but there are criticisms that the take-up of that fund is poor and the system is somewhat complicated. The grants given by the fund are one-offs, and are limited to a period of two months. There is a lot of evidence to show that the average time between leaving a partner and lodging an application is approximately three months. That is because it is difficult to find a solicitor, who then has to gather together the information, and all that takes time. Although the Government have a fast-track unit at Sheffield to deal with some of the cases more quickly, the average is still 47 days. If one puts those two lengths of time together, it is clearly longer than two months. What will happen to those women after the two-month period for which they receive funding? 
 The process can be speeded up if people really know the system, but Southall Black Sisters told me that it was increasingly difficult to find a solicitor who understands the problems and is willing to deal with them on legal aid. Furthermore, the organisation does not want to direct women towards any provision that is less than the best. The other comment made was that the £40,000 will only help 23 women. I am not clear how long the £40,000 is meant to last. If it is meant to last for a year, that is great for the 23 women who are being helped, but what about the several hundred others who do not have access to any money? 
 Will the Government consider a fast-tracking system? I gather from reports in Lords Hansard that Baroness Scotland was going to have a look at the provision in respect of sponsors. I have mentioned 
 deterrents. The principle has already been established in various forms—by the Child Support Agency, for example—that costs can be reclaimed from sponsors. The system seems to work well in countries such as the USA, Canada, Austria and Denmark, so what is the problem with a similar system working in the UK?

Sally Keeble: I want to talk briefly about some of the issues behind the amendment, and to ask my hon. Friend the Minister to look at alternative ways of achieving some progress on this, because there is a problem with what happens to victims of domestic violence who fall into the relevant categories.
 The domestic violence exemption has been of benefit to many women. In Northampton, we have a large Bangladeshi community and there are substantial domestic violence issues there. The exemption has worked well. It can be accessed, and cases are dealt with sympathetically and promptly. However, there is an accommodation problem while cases are being dealt with. 
 Let me break the problem down carefully. Support in terms of accommodation in the refuge system can be accessed for the victim of domestic violence. Therefore, often the woman can be catered for, but there is a problem with the children. Many of the women I have seen have several children, some of whom are very young. There is a real need consider how that can be dealt with. These amendments might do that to an extent, but they do not deal specifically with children. There is also a degree of resistance simply to lifting the ''no recourse to public funds'' ruling, albeit that is only for 47 days, because it is felt that that would compromise the integrity of the system. 
 The problem could be dealt with in other ways. Women who are particularly vulnerable can be supported under community care legislation, if a proper assessment is made of their needs. A much more likely solution is that the children could be supported by social services under the Children Act 1989; that could extend to providing support for accommodation. When young children are involved and a violent father is around, the obvious thing to do is to house the children with their mother rather than to take them into care or leave them with the father. 
 I admit that arguing that case has been incredibly difficult. There have been a few test cases, but lawyers who will deal with community care legislation or the Children Act 1998 are few and far between. If the Minister is thinking of not accepting the amendments, will he undertake to talk to colleagues, especially the Minister for Children at the Department for Education and Skills and Ministers at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister who have responsibility for local government housing policy, to find a way to ensure that the most vulnerable victims of domestic violence—very young children—are properly supported? 
 This is an extremely serious issue. I had to deal with the case of a woman who had been in this country for two years. Her violent husband had taken her passport away. She left him only when he took a knife to one of 
 the children. She was pregnant and after an appalling series of events, ended up having the baby in hospital, but the baby was very ill and died. The woman stayed in hospital for 10 days until his life support machine was turned off, and then for five weeks more because no one would house her. Meanwhile, the children were taken by the husband's family. To stay with a man who had taken a knife to one of them was not a clever proposal. I accept that that is an extreme example but, in such circumstances, it must be possible to make sure that, if the Government are not willing to compromise the support systems set out by the Home Office, they make other Departments work together to protect the interests of the most vulnerable victims.

Ann Keen: The organisation Southall Black Sisters is based in a constituency neighbouring mine. I have known the brave women there and the work that they do within the community for many years, especially in west London. That organisation and Hounslow Asian Women's Refuge welcome the Bill as a first step in creating a comprehensive legislative approach to domestic violence in this country. However, there is now an urgent need to ensure that the Bill recognises women whose immigration status is dependent on that of their husband or partner and who are trapped in violent relationships as much by the restriction on recourse to public funds and their fear of destitution and financial exploitation as by their fear of being returned to their country of origin.
 The women's fear of destitution stems directly from their lack of access to welfare benefits and housing. It prevents many of them from making meaningful choices about leaving violent relationships. Many Members of Parliament do not have to face such women in their constituency advice surgeries because their cases are dealt with under cover within the community. The seriousness of the crimes that are being committed against women, not only by their husband or partner, but in many instances by other family member, goes unnoticed by MPs and perhaps by many community leaders. 
 We have heard from the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) about how difficult it is to secure legal representation. I am fully aware of that problem, having lived in the community for many years. Domestic violence is one of the most harrowing areas of life of which I am aware. It is so difficult for women who are working on the front line. I assure members of the Committee that the stress suffered 24 hours a day by those who are working with women who have no recourse to public funds is unprecedented. 
 In my professional life in nursing and since becoming a Member of Parliament, severe cases of domestic violence have been brought to my attention. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister and his colleagues have tried hard to find solutions, but the last resort money is inadequate. We are making attempts to deal with a serious situation but, without question, we are making some women very unequal in our country.

Cheryl Gillan: I am very sympathetic to the hon. Lady's argument. I have a large ethnic minority population in my constituency. Even if such people have the courage to come forward and let me know about the situation that they or others are in, when I ask whether I can take any action to help them, they often say, ''No, we just wanted you to know about it.'' They do not want me to do anything, because that will create an even more difficult situation for them in the community. Members of Parliament are often aware of such problems, but are prohibited by the very constituents whom they wish to help from doing anything about them. Does the hon. Lady agree that that is even more frustrating, particularly for an MP?

Ann Keen: Yes, but we are here today to say that such requests have been made to us and that Ministers and their colleagues are trying desperately hard to respond to them. Even though people in that situation may feel at the moment that it is not always possible for us to be their advocates in the community, we have a responsibility to raise these issues—my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mrs. Cryer), who has returned to her place, is an example to us all when it comes to courage and raising such sensitive matters in the community—and these circumstances do not mean that we cannot now find a solution to this very serious problem.
 My hon. Friend the Minister and his colleagues are looking seriously at doing that, and the Bill is one of the most important that we could pass for everyone in these communities. It concerns human rights, equality and the decency of women who are trapped in violent situations and may have reached the point of no return. Suicide is very common, and none of us can sit easy with our conscience when we know that. I therefore urge the Minister to be favourable to the situation of women with no recourse to public funds.

Paul Goggins: My feeling is that this is probably one of the most important debates that the Committee will have, and I thank all hon. Members who have contributed so far. The hon. Members for Chesham and Amersham and for Romsey spoke on behalf of their parties, and I also pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) and for Brentford and Isleworth (Ann Keen), who spoke from experience of supporting organisations and individuals who are caught in this dreadful situation.
 I shall deal briefly with amendment No. 13 and new clause 14 and then move on to the substantial issue. Amendment No. 13 would include in the victims code provisions to exempt victims of domestic violence who are subject to immigration controls from any proceedings that may alter their immigration status while they continue to be victims of, or under threat of, domestic violence. As the Committee is aware, the code is intended to define the minimum statutory services that criminal justice agencies should provide to victims of crime. It is therefore simply not 
 appropriate for such provisions to be included in the code, however sympathetic we may be to the sentiments behind them. 
 New clause 14 would place a responsibility on the commissioner for victims and witnesses by requiring him to 
''have regard to the effect of the Immigration Rules on victims of domestic violence.'' 
Given the commissioner's already substantial scope to consider the needs of various victims, and his power to make recommendations to the Home Office, which is responsible for the immigration rules, I am resisting the new clause on the basis that it is already within the commissioner's power to consider such issues. It would merely be a duplication; there is no need to include it.

Lady Hermon: Under the Bill as drafted, the remit of the new commissioner for victims and witnesses does not extend to Northern Ireland, but I know that the Minister will bring me good news when we come to debate that and will indicate that it will extend there. However, what he has just explained does not apply to Northern Ireland. We do not have a commissioner with the powers to consider the very special case of women in the situation that has been described.
 I remind the Minister that although Northern Ireland has only a few asylum seekers and although we may have our differences one with another, asylum seekers are very welcome. I ask him to reflect on the gap that has become apparent in view of the fact that the remit of the victims commissioner will not extend to Northern Ireland, unless he promises me otherwise.

Paul Goggins: That was a very good spot. We will come to those issues during our deliberations on the victims commissioner. Clearly, this is not the time to go into the detail of that. One of the undertakings that I will give the hon. Lady is that at the conclusion of those deliberations I will ensure that Northern Ireland Office Ministers are aware of our debates. In consultation with communities in Northern Ireland, they will be seeking to ensure that appropriate provisions are made for victims and witnesses there. That is the responsibility of those Ministers, rather than the responsibility of the Home Office. I hope that we can gently tease that out. I have just used an argument in relation to the victims commissioner and she rightly pointed out a slight discordance with its application to Northern Ireland. Wherever that occurs, I will make a note of it and bring it to the attention of my hon. Friends.
 On amendment No. 36, the issue of domestic violence victims who are subject to immigration control was discussed thoroughly in the other place, and we had a useful and informative debate on Second Reading. I have made my involvement in those discussions clear throughout. While we do not intend to change the immigration or benefit rules, we intend to try to help and support very vulnerable women. 
 It might help the Committee if I set out in detail what the Government are doing to support this particular group of victims of domestic violence. This is an area of activity in which we can be pleased to note 
 the progress being made. As has been mentioned, the immigration rules now make specific provision for an application to be made on the ground of domestic violence and we have extended the types of evidence that can be used as proof of it. Even if it is not possible for a victim to produce evidence of a conviction, a caution or a protection order against their spouse or partner, they can provide other evidence, such as medical reports, letters of support from a refuge or a letter from local social services. 
 Applications made on that basis are now flagged up and dealt with as a matter of priority within the immigration and nationality directorate. The hon. Member for Romsey referred to this and I am pleased to note that the average time taken to process them has fallen considerably—to about 47 days. That means that where the application is successful and indefinite leave to remain is granted, the time without recourse to public funds is kept to a minimum.

Sandra Gidley: I do not wish to be churlish and I welcome the improvement, but one other issue that has been raised is the fact that if someone does not get a decision in their favour they are no longer entitled to appeal. I understand that there are no special domestic violence measures or relaxations in that regard. Will the Minister clarify the situation?

Paul Goggins: It should be possible to appeal and I undertake to provide the hon. Lady with the information on the process. The issue involves recourse to public funds, but the process should still be in place.
 I want to emphasise that we are working with voluntary organisations and others to try to reduce still further that average time of 47 days taken to consider the initial application. I was privileged and pleased to be involved recently in a meeting— alongside several colleagues from this Committee—with representatives from Southall Black Sisters and Women's Aid. I understand that they will shortly be spending a day in Sheffield with the IND caseworker teams that deal with applications for indefinite leave to remain under the domestic violence rules. 
 I am grateful to the representatives of those organisations for taking part in that activity, which is an important development. It provides an opportunity for them to talk to the caseworkers about domestic violence and the situations in which the victims with whom they are in contact find themselves, as well as for the caseworkers to explain to representatives of the organisations the problems that they encounter and to examine technical issues involving the procedures. The organisations can then better advise the women they work with. I hope that all that improves understanding on both sides and provides a platform for an ongoing and constructive dialogue that leads to an even swifter disposal of the applications.

Sandra Gidley: I am delighted that this exchange is going to take place, but I gather from what the Minister says that the staff of the unit giving special attention to fast-tracking have received no particular training in domestic violence. That concerns me, because there is a general lack of understanding of the
 problems relating to domestic violence, so if a specific unit has been set up with caseworkers to deal with the problem, the individuals involved should be made more aware of the wider issues and problems.

Paul Goggins: I agree that the officers who work in that unit should be sensitive, aware and trained appropriately. I am not in a position to comment on the specific training that they receive, but the meeting that they will have with the representatives of Southall Black Sisters and Women's Aid can only help to raise their awareness and understanding, which will be all to the good.
 With regard to some changes that we are introducing, we have also agreed that if the applicant has no means of support, applications for settlement on the basis of domestic violence will be exempt from the fee that is normally charged. That is a significant exemption. The charge for postal applications is £155, and personal callers are charged £255. Those fees are waived in such cases. 
 The supporting people arrangements enable domestic violence victims to get access to housing-related support services. I am aware that those arrangements do not cover rent and living costs, but they have an important part to play in providing services such as advocacy and liaison with statutory agencies. In addition, the Home Office has made a one-off grant of £40,000 to be provided to Women's Aid to bolster its last resort fund—several hon. Members referred to that. This fund has been run by Women's Aid for several years, and its members can apply to it for funding to cover the living expenses of women who are making an application for indefinite leave to remain because of domestic violence. That money will help to meet the rent and living costs of the small number of refuge cases, where the women have no recourse to a public fund.

Cheryl Gillan: Does the Minister envisage that amount being granted annually?

Paul Goggins: I will come to the future arrangements in a moment.
 I have had good dialogue with members from the organisations mentioned: Southall Black Sisters and Women's Aid. They made it clear that they retain their strong view that we ought to table amendments along the lines that they suggest. I accept their right to hold on to their opinion, but I have also asked them to work with us to find a practical way forward. The impression I have is that they are willing to do that. 
 First, we need to establish as precisely as we can how many women will fall into this category in any one year. There are some differences of opinion on what the figure might be, but we need to arrive at an agreed figure. Is it 500 or 200? We need to be sure. Secondly, we need to be sure of what the costs would be of supporting those particular individuals in any one year. Thirdly, we need to examine the last resort fund to review its effectiveness and administration to see how well it is meeting need even within its current remit. Those are the three things that I have agreed 
 with representatives of the organisations and colleagues on this Committee that we need to work on together as we move forward.

Sally Keeble: The Minister talks about quantifying the problem. From a substantial Bangladeshi community, over a couple of years there were about six to 10 cases involving about 18 to 20 children—for them there is nothing. If legislation was used properly, it might be possible to make some headway.

Paul Goggins: My hon. Friend spoke powerfully about this issue in relation to children, and it is clear from my remarks that we have far from concluded on it. I will weigh her comments on children very carefully as we continue to discuss the issue with voluntary organisations and others. Clearly, the welfare of children is equally important in such situations.

Sandra Gidley: The Minister referred to ongoing dialogue with Southall Black Sisters and other organisations in order to try to establish, among other things, how much money is involved. I shall refer to a briefing from that organisation. The concerns it deals with might have been raised in early days when information was not available, but I want to put them on record. Southall Black Sisters said
 ''It is not possible to provide an accurate costing for the funds required to support women with no recourse to public funds. We require statistics from the Home Office on the operation of the Domestic Violence Rule including information on numbers of applicants, numbers of dependants, processing times of applications at all stages of the process including appeal and judicial review, and success rates of applications at each stage. Until we have this information we cannot assess on average for how long women will require support and accommodation and on behalf of how many dependants.'' 
When I spoke to representatives of Southall Black Sisters, they seemed to believe that the information was not forthcoming. I appreciate that it was early days after the meeting and that it may not yet have been provided with the information, but will the Minister confirm that the information required by the organisations will be provided if possible?

Paul Goggins: My impression from the contacts that I have had in recent weeks is that the organisation is assiduous and persistent in its campaigning, and I suspect that it will remain that way. However, I assure the Committee that we intend to be open and get the benefit of such groups' experience, and we hope that we will be able to add to their understanding. It might not be possible to reach agreement on the figures, and I am not suggesting that it is a certainty that we will. However, we will try, and we shall use their experience and hope that they will benefit from ours.
 Let me tell my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North that I have already had meetings with Ministers in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and will continue to have regular meetings with the Minister for Children as part of my other responsibilities in the Home Office. In all those discussions, we will continue to raise the issue and try to find a way forward, as we are trying to do with the voluntary organisations concerned. I can give my hon. 
 Friend that assurance. We are trying to avoid the creation of a loophole in our immigration and benefits system through which people who are not the victims of domestic violence might seek to find their way into this country. We want to ensure integrity and public confidence in our benefits and immigration system. 
 The hon. Member for Romsey mentioned the proposal that we consider pursuing sponsors for the repayment of money; my colleague Baroness Scotland undertook in the other place to consider that. We have done so and we will continue to weigh up the suggestion. However, at this point, we do not feel that it would provide the solution. It works on paper, but in practice it could become a complex and expensive administrative process. In addition, it might put victims of domestic violence at unnecessary risk from people with whom they have had an association in the past, which would concern me more than the administrative cost. We need to weigh those issues up.

Ann Cryer: I have had experience of that point. I dealt with six cases of very young ladies who were abandoned by their husbands and in-laws. In each case, I felt duty bound to mention the Child Support Agency and say that their husbands should be paying them. Each time, they became absolutely terrified. They would not go to a solicitor to get equal share of a house or do anything like that, as they were scared that their husbands or in-laws would come round to beat them. I am not sure that we can make any progress in that respect.

Paul Goggins: That is my concern, as well. The heart of our concerns has to be the welfare of the women and their children. I am not ruling out the proposal in our deliberations, but it is only fair to point out to the hon. Member for Romsey that we have yet not been persuaded to pursue it. However, we are seeking a practical solution, and I hope that we will be able to come back and give further details, if not to this Committee, then on Report.
 I want what other Committee members want: to provide effective support for women who are caught up in a dreadful situation. My argument is simply that we do not need to make further amendments to pursue that aim; we need practical application, and I commit myself to continuing to provide that application to try to find a solution.

Cheryl Gillan: I have listened to the Minister, and it is obvious that he has the best interests of this group of people—mostly women—in mind. However, I remain to be convinced. There are a lot of unanswered questions, many raised by the Minister himself.
 The dialogues that the Minister said will take place between voluntary organisations and officials in Sheffield will help, but I am not sure that he has arrived in his own mind at a solution to the issues. The matter is complex, but there are a group of isolated people who are not looked after and who are in danger. There will be disappointment that at this stage of the Bill's passage there was nothing in it to indicate the Minister's good intentions. 
 I know that the issue will be raised on Report, and I will not be so churlish as to press my amendment. There are merits in the other amendments, tabled by the hon. Member for Romsey and Government Members. I will withdraw my amendment, but I give notice to the Minister that this would be a suitable subject to explore on Report, particularly if he gave us more information in advance of Report. He has been courteous in all his dealings with every Committee member. If, after consultation with his officials here or in Sheffield, there are further or better particulars to pass on to the Committee, we look forward to receiving them.

Paul Goggins: Let me underline the fact that, as the situation unfolds, I will keep Committee members fully up to date.

Cheryl Gillan: I am most satisfied with that. Although I am disappointed, I remain eternally optimistic. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Cheryl Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in clause 21, page 14, line 33, at end insert—
'''services'' means as specified in the code but including protection, personal support, to receive and provide information and to receive explanation.'.
 The provision of services to victims of crime goes to the heart of part 3 of the Bill. I would therefore like to ensure that the term ''services'' in clause 21 is fully understood by all those who are required to interpret the legislation. I have been excellently briefed by Victim Support on the amendment, which is based on a set of principles that reflects Victim Support's 30 years' experience of providing services to victims. Those principles are based on its knowledge of the rights that victims say that they would like to have. I know how much store this Government set on consultation; in effect, the consultation has been going on for more than 30 years. 
 Victim Support has promoted victims' rights for a long time. In 1995, it produced a report called ''The Rights of Victims of Crime'', which stated that such rights should include the right to receive information and explanation about the progress of their case; the opportunity to provide their own information about the case for use in the criminal justice process; the right to be protected in any way necessary; and the right to receive respect, recognition and support. The amendment is based on the wording of the 1995 report. When a similar amendment was debated in another place, concern was voiced that it would not provide sufficient flexibility. Of course, we do not want the description of victim services to be too prescriptive, as we want them to be enhanced in future. However, it can only be helpful for those interpreting the legislation to know the intention behind it, not only now but in years to come. I hope that the redrafted amendment is now considered to be sufficiently general to allow for future enhancements while at the same time setting down the essence of what services will mean for the victims. I look forward to hearing the Solicitor-General's reply.

Sandra Gidley: I welcome the fact that the code will be introduced by statutory instrument, but I am also aware that Victim Support would rather see a minimum prescribed in the Bill. I know of the Government's current intentions. It is important to recognise that victims may need access to a wide range of services. I wish to cite a small example. It is important that health professionals are more aware of the problem of domestic violence. They could easily be expected as a norm to check with patients whether their injuries had been caused by a crime and refer them appropriately. If the Bill sets out that health professionals must be more actively involved, that can only be a good thing.
 I do not believe that members of the Committee want the code to be so rigid that it would be difficult to change in the future, but a basic minimum of services outlined in the Bill will protect it from future Governments of whatever colour who might think differently about the subject and want to diminish the support that is available to victims.

Harriet Harman: Several important points have been made in the debate, and we agree with all of them, but we will resist the amendment. The hon. Member for Romsey is absolutely right. The health service has a critical role to play. A great deal of work has already been done, but there is much more to do to ensure that the health service recognises that as well as treating them for their injuries, its role is that of preventing people becoming victims of further offences. Furthermore, we in the domestic violence inter-ministerial working group regard it important that our colleagues at the Department of Health work with all the NHS organisations, including primary care, GPs, accident and emergency, health visitors and the royal colleges, to bring the health service into the whole picture of domestic violence.
 Amendment No. 18 would give examples of services to be delivered to victims of crime by the agencies that are covered by the code of practice. Although it attempts to clarify and define what services may be included in the code and tries to leave open the possibility of other types of services being provided, we consider that it is too prescriptive. It could lead those who are charged with revising the code in the future to believe that any new agency obligation should fall into a category specified in the amendment. 
 Members of the Committee might be aware that there is a legal principle that, when illustrative examples are provided in statute, it is presumed that a definition is supposed to include only the types of issues in the illustrative example. The irony is that, by saying in a statute, ''For example, X, Y and Z'', there is the consequence of narrowing matters to X, Y and Z, which is the opposite of what the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham said that she would like to do. That principle could restrict our flexibility when we come to finalise the first version of the code, and it could restrict it even more when the code is revised in future. 
 Although the hon. Lady's amendment adequately summarises the services in the illustrative draft of the code that we put before Parliament shortly after the introduction of the Bill last September, there is far more opportunity to develop new, innovative services for victims if we do not provide prescriptive examples at the outset. We are still at the relatively early stages of developing and embedding good support for victims. Despite the long decades of good practice in Victim Support, we know that we can and should be doing other things. I do not want us, in our current state of knowledge, to draw a line under that without returning to the House with primary legislation. 
 We take on board the points that have been raised and welcome those made on behalf of Victim Support and in respect of health services, but we urge hon. Members to resist the amendment.

Lady Hermon: I understand that the Solicitor-General is considering the draft code of practice. May I ask her as she does so to reflect on the Northern Ireland code of practice on victims of crime, which was issued in 1998; it is six years old now and out of date. There are great lessons to be learned from the experience in Northern Ireland, particularly because after six years the Northern Ireland Office research and statistical information says that there is a high dissatisfaction rating—42 per cent.—particularly among defence barristers, and that
 ''A high proportion of interviewees did not have confidence in the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in bringing people who commit crimes to justice.'' 
That is the experience after six years with a code of practice for victims of crime in Northern Ireland.

Harriet Harman: I take on board the points that the hon. Lady makes about the Northern Ireland code of practice. I will, like my colleague the Home Office Minister, bring them to the attention of our colleagues in Northern Ireland, and I shall read across for our own work.
 Let me now deal with a point made by the hon. Member for Romsey. There is already protection from future Governments in clause 22(9), which says that the service levels in the code cannot be reduced. The truth is that none of us can envisage anybody retreating from this measure. It is hard to imagine that any Government could get away with reducing a path that is so well mapped and on which there is consensus. I ask the Committee to oppose the amendment.

Cheryl Gillan: I find it amusing that the Solicitor-General agrees with everything that the Conservatives have said, but encourages the Committee to resist the amendment. It is eminently sensible if, having listened carefully to the objections that were made in the other place, dealt with them and withdrawn the amendments, the Government is still resisting. I will always acknowledge that we do not want to achieve a limitation leading to too prescriptive a definition, but I remain convinced that having no definition could be even more damaging.
 The inclusion of the word ''including'' in the amendment fully answered the problems that were mentioned by the Minister in another place and by the 
 Solicitor-General today. In meetings, there did not appear to be much Government opposition to this proposal, and I was hoping that this amendment would be acceptable as redrafted, but my argument is falling on stony ground.

Lady Hermon: Perhaps the hon. Lady could consider the wording of the amendment to which she referred. She put particular emphasis on the word ''including'', but the next word is ''protection''. If the Solicitor-General and others are to force us to a Division on this amendment, it contradicts what she has been saying about non-jury trials. What if those who fear domestic violence and who do not want to be intimidated as a witness in court favour a non-jury trial? The amendment, which includes the word ''protection'', undermines a few of her earlier arguments.

Cheryl Gillan: I am not entirely sure that follow that argument. When I moved the amendment, I said that I had tabled it at the particular request of Victim Support, which wanted it to be considered. The report that it sent me some years ago revealed that victims wished to be protected in any way necessary. Victim Support therefore felt that including the definition in the Bill was the right way to proceed.
 I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. It is important to know that the Government have listened carefully to the arguments, but it is disappointing that, even after an attempted revision of the amendment, they still resist it. I am sure that I will not get the amendment past the Committee, but I hope that that will not be the pattern for the rest of the Bill. We hoped that there would be some give and take with the Government in the discussions in the Committee and that the legislation could be refined during its consideration. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 16.New Clause 16 Provision of explanations to victims—

New Clause 16 - Provision of explanations to victims—

'(1) In any case since the revision of the Victims Charter in 1996 where a prosecuting authority decides— 
 (a) not to charge a person with a criminal offence, 
 (b) not to proceed with a criminal charge, or 
 (c) to charge a person with a lesser offence, 
 it shall provide the victim with an explanation. 
 (2) The provisions of subsection (1) have effect notwithstanding any other enactment, any claim to legal professional privilege or the provisions of any code issued under section 21. 
 (3) An authority which fails to comply with subsection (1) shall be liable to civil proceedings.'.

Cheryl Gillan: I may be moving the new clause inadequately, because I am pleased to do so on behalf of the—

Marion Roe: Order. I remind the hon. Lady that she cannot move new clause 16 at this stage. The new clause would come further on in the Bill; when we reach that point, it can be moved. We are currently considering whether clause 21 should stand part of the Bill, with which we are also debating new clause 16.

Cheryl Gillan: I stand corrected. I chose the wrong words, Dame Marion.
 In speaking to new clause 16, I refer to a conversation that I had with the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire (Mr. Barnes) yesterday. He asked me whether I could speak to the new clause on his behalf. He has been assiduous in backing the provision of explanations to victims—the title of the proposed new clause—not only by tabling early-day motion 1259, with which I am sure the Minister is familiar, but by having the ingenuity to raise the matter in business questions on 10 June. The hon. Gentleman feels particularly strongly about the issue. I know that he has been provided with a written explanation, but I hope that the Solicitor-General will put on the record in the Committee the reasons why the Government resist a provision, which, at first sight, appears eminently sensible. I would also like to know whether the proposed new clause could be applied to lay witnesses. I will listen to what the Minister has to say before I comment further on that. 
 I shall raise a couple of points on clause stand part debate. Having looked at the indicative draft of the code of practice for victims, I should like to know how the Minister envisages the geographical coverage of that code of practice. For example, if a Glasgow woman were mugged in Carlisle, would she be covered by the code of practice? A Carlisle woman mugged in Glasgow would not be covered by the code. What provisions are there for cross-border co-operation? We have heard about the code of practice for victims in Northern Ireland, but what is there in Scotland, and how will cross-border provisions be dealt with? 
 I also notice that the indicative draft of breaches of the code includes the opportunity to raise issues with an MP and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. I do not want to get into a discussion on the indicative draft—you would not allow me to, Dame Marion—but because MPs are envisaged as part of the equation, I should like to know what impact assessment has been carried out on the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Notwithstanding that, I am currently filling in a questionnaire, as I believe all MPs are, in connection with the work of various commissioners. I hope that the Minister can address those points.

Harriet Harman: Clause 21 would require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice that would be binding on the criminal justice and other organisations that deal with victims of crime and are named in the code. The code will list the services that victims should receive from those organisations. It will build considerably on the current victims charter, creating clear rights for all victims, in terms of information, advice, personal support and protection.
 I will have to get back to the hon. Lady on cross-border issues, but I hope that there will be a sensible outcome on those matters.
 Under the current indicative draft, the offence has to be committed in England or Wales, and the person providing the service under the code also has to be in England or Wales. However, we hope that the code will be followed as a matter of good practice in cross-border cases; that would make sense. There has been extensive debate with the parliamentary ombudsman about the regulatory impact issues. 
 In many parts of the country, excellent standards of service are already being delivered to victims by criminal justice agencies and organisations. We want the code to set the minimum consistent standard of service that victims can expect to receive, wherever they live. Clause 21(2) and (4) allows victims of certain crimes or victims with specific characteristics to be treated differently under the code. That reflects the fact that certain victims, such as victims of rape or domestic violence, may require an enhanced service. 
 Subsection (3) ensures that services can be provided to people other than victims, such as relatives of victims of homicide or parents of child victims. Subsection (6) ensures that it is not necessary for an offender to be charged or convicted before the victim is entitled to receive services under the code. The test for whether the code should apply in a particular case will therefore depend on a judgment, usually of a police officer, regarding the conduct reported or complained about. The clause is drafted to ensure maximum flexibility for the types of services, organisations and local structures covered by the code of practice.

Lady Hermon: Will the Solicitor-General bear in mind a phrase used by Baroness Scotland in the other place during the consideration of the Bill? It struck me very deeply. She said:
 ''I need to be clear that the intention of this legislation is to introduce rights for all victims of crime. We are not looking to create a hierarchy of victims, attaching greater importance to some types of victims than others.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 March 2004; Vol. 658, c. 1452.] 
I could not agree more. That is a wonderful sentiment. The Northern Ireland code of practice on victims of crime is now six years old. What in heaven's name is the justification for not extending clause 21 to the people of Northern Ireland today? Why do we have a two-tier system, and why is there a hierarchy of victims? There are those in Northern Ireland to whom the new code of practice will not apply, and those in England and Wales to whom it will.

Harriet Harman: The noble Baroness was quite right to say that we do not want a hierarchy of victims. Of course, we have to recognise that some victims have greater needs than others, and some offences create greater vulnerability because of the difficulty that the victims face in coming to court. We must have a wide range of services and recognise that different sorts of victims have different needs.
 We want to reflect and promote best practice in victim care in the criminal justice system and to encourage positive developments for the future. The victims group and the vulnerable or intimidated witnesses working group in Northern Ireland have created a sub-group to focus specifically on the provision of information to victims. Part of its remit is to review the existing code of practice. I am sure that the hon. Member for North Down will need to discuss that further with our colleagues at the Northern Ireland Office.

Lady Hermon: I bring to the attention of the Solicitor-General and all Committee members a recent leaflet, published in 2002 by the Northern Ireland Office, called ''Information for Victims of Crime''. It gives a series of telephone numbers on the back page. For example, under the heading ''Personal Distress'' it states:
 ''If you are distressed or going through a personal crisis and need a sympathetic ear, telephone The Samaritans.'' 
That is deplorable. What the Solicitor-General has said is inconsistent with the information that was given to victims of crime in Northern Ireland. It is unacceptable that clause 21 does not extend to the good people of Northern Ireland—of whatever political background. It is awful.

Harriet Harman: The hon. Lady made her points clearly and with some force; no doubt they will need to be examined.
 The debate on new clause 16 has shown an example of the cross-party nature of the issues. The clause seeks to ensure that victims are given explanations in cases where no charges are brought against a suspect, where charges are not proceeded with or where the original charge is substituted with a lesser one. Where no such explanation is given, the organisation concerned will be liable for civil proceedings. 
 I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Derbyshire for tabling the proposal, and I agree with the sentiment behind what he is seeking to achieve. I apologise to Committee members if they are fed up with my saying that we agree with the sentiment. We must get the sentiment right but we must also get the legislation right. Part of the discussion in Committee is about airing more widely the issues; the lessons will be learned. We must get the legislation in the correct form. I agree with the sentiment, because victims can be left perplexed and angry when they have been led to believe that the charges were to be brought against a particular suspect only to be told, sometimes, as has happened in the past, without further explanation, that charges have been dropped or that they will not be proceeded with. It might be even worse if they are told that a defendant is to be charged with a serious offence and they later learn that the charge has been reduced to what seems like a relatively minor one. It is important that, wherever possible, victims are given an explanation for such decisions. 
 We think that the new code will achieve that. In the draft code, a copy of which is available in the House Library, the Crown Prosecution Service has just such 
 an obligation and the police have a similar one in so far as they still have a decision-making role in relation to charging. It is extraordinary to think that it used quite often to be the case that a victim would learn that a charge had been dropped when they read about it in a newspaper. That is the background to all this. People can remember that until quite recently, charges would be dropped or downgraded, and the victim would never be told. To some extent, progress of substance has been made. The CPS has a programme on direct communication with victims and witnesses, and it must now explain to the victim why it is downgrading or dropping a charge.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the Solicitor-General. Do the provisions to which she has just referred apply to all prosecuting authorities where a prosecution takes place in the name of the Crown?

Harriet Harman: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would tell me what examples he is thinking about. I can think only of prosecutions by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, where one would not communicate with the victim. Does he have examples of prosecutions that are not undertaken by the CPS where communication with the victim would be needed? Am I being dense?

David Heath: I am trying to think of an example, which was why I was slow to rise when the Solicitor-General began to ask for one. I accept that in the case of most other prosecuting authorities there would not directly be a victim. In principle, though, the clause should extend to all prosecuting authorities, and they should be treated in exactly the same way.

Harriet Harman: I am trying to run through in my mind circumstances in which there could be a personal victim; there will be witnesses but not necessarily a victim. We will think about that.
 That change to which I referred was long overdue, and it is becoming routine practice for the CPS to communicate when there is a change in the charge. The current indicative draft of the code does not apply to the Health and Safety Executive, but we can examine that. It is in the scope of the Bill to extend the code, and that is helpful. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman was probably making a more substantial point than he realised.

Cheryl Gillan: That will be music to the ears of the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire, because when he raised the issue at business questions, he referred to a Department with the responsibility to prosecute refusing to do so and using legal and professional privilege to escape that responsibility. He obviously had specific cases in mind—

David Heath: The Department of Trade and Industry.

Cheryl Gillan: Indeed.
 What the Solicitor-General said is probably good news, but there seems to be a lacuna. There is no doubt that nothing would bring the victims code of practice into disrepute more quickly than people feeling that 
 they had been left out of the equation, not knowing what had happened and reading about it all in the newspapers or hearing it on the news.

Harriet Harman: Unfortunately, I had not got to my ''however'' point. I hope that the hon. Lady will still be as pleased when I have made it.
 However, there may be occasions on which it is not possible to provide an explanation for a decision. It might, for example, jeopardise the continuing investigation of the offence or put the safety of a suspect at risk. In those circumstances, the CPS is expected to record the reasons for not passing on an explanation. 
 As for enforcement of the code, we are particularly keen to avoid setting up a new area of litigation during the drafting process. Complaints will therefore be investigated by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, who will have access to all the documentation necessary to judge whether the police and the CPS have behaved reasonably in withholding explanations in a case. 
 I hope that those new procedures satisfy my hon. Friends. If not, I regret to say that we have to resist new clause 16. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22 - Procedure

Cheryl Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 20, in clause 22, page 14, line 39, leave out
'and the Lord Chancellor'
 and insert 
'the Lord Chancellor and the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses as appointed under section 25(1).'

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 21, in clause 22, page 15, line 5, leave out 'and the Lord Chancellor' and insert
'the Lord Chancellor and the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses as appointed under section 25(1);'.

Cheryl Gillan: I hope that I am giving the Government an opportunity to state on the record that the commissioner for victims and witnesses will be consulted even if he or she is not named in the Bill. The Bill does not specifically include the commissioner in the consultation process for preparing a draft of the victims code. That process is established under clause 22. The amendment would ensure that the new commissioner was fully consulted when the Home Secretary prepared and considered the draft code or any revisions before it was laid before Parliament.
 The role of the commissioner is to be newly created, with his or her appointment being made by the Home Secretary under clause 25(1). To that extent, the commissioner will have statutory duties that are directly relevant to any revision of the code. For example, the Bill obliges the commissioner to keep the code under review and enables him or her to make proposals ad hoc to the Home Secretary. Clause 22 
 lays out the formal consultation process prior to introducing and revising the code. However, although it ensures that the Attorney-General and the Lord Chancellor are consulted, it does not provide the commissioner with an identified role at that stage. That is a missed opportunity. 
 On Report in the other place, a similar amendment was debated together with an amendment that would have enabled the commissioner as well as the Home Secretary to initiate revisions to the code of practice. At that point, concern was expressed that the commissioner's role had not been specified in sufficient detail. The Government responded by voicing concern that those amendments might trespass on the proper role of the elected Executive to make decisions about policy and resourcing. 
 The noble Baroness Scotland of Asthal said: 
 ''Of course responsibility for making decisions which may directly impinge on the allocation of resources will be properly discharged by the ministerial officers and their colleagues along with the Secretaries of State who will be entrusted with that task . . . It would be inappropriate for the commissioner to have such a large role to play in relation to the code of practice. The commissioner will be able to offer his comments and amendments to the Secretary of State; and his suggestions will be given very serious consideration by the Government.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 March 2004; Vol. 658, c. 1434-5.] 
I have taken on board what the Government have said about the distinct roles of Ministers and the commissioner. Therefore, the amendment provides the commissioner not with the power to make any decisions in respect of resources but merely with the right to be consulted. That is the nub of the matter. 
 The amendment would ensure that the consultation process takes full advantage of both the commissioner's statutory duty to keep the code under review and his or her knowledge and experience of victim issues. By providing the commissioner with a specific named role in the consultation, the Government will benefit from his or her expertise, and they will have a clear remit to work within. The Minister said that the Government would give the commissioner's suggestions serious consideration. If that is the Government's intention, including in the Bill a duty to consult the commissioner Parliament would underscore that intention in statute. 
 The amendment will enable the commissioner to discharge his or her role effectively at the heart of victim and witness policy. At the same time as giving effect to the Government's intention, the amendment will go some way to addressing the concerns of those in the other place who argue that there is insufficient clarity about the role of the commissioner. 
 When the Minister in the Lords responded to this point, she was also dealing with a stronger amendment to give the commissioner greater powers to revise the code. I assure the Minister that this amendment does not provide the commissioner with decision-making powers that would affect public policy and resources. The argument on this occasion is about ensuring that the commissioner is at the heart of the consultation process in victims policy. My understanding is that the 
 Government have suggested that they are keen to do that. Therefore, I would be interested to hear the Minister's response to this point.

David Heath: We concur.

Paul Goggins: This will be a brief response, and I hope that it provides the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham with the reassurance that she seeks.
 Amendments Nos. 20 and 21 would introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to consult with the commissioner for victims and witnesses when drafting and revising the code of practice. We resist them because it would be inappropriate for the commissioner to have a statutory role in relation to the code of practice. 
 The commissioner will have a key responsibility in ensuring the effectiveness of the code. The commissioner will also be an important source of advice to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in relation to the code, as and when it is revised, along with other sources, such as the Parliamentary Commissioner and the agencies that have signed up to deliver on the obligations in the code. However, overall responsibility for the code and any revisions to it must lie with the Secretary of State, in conjunction with his criminal justice ministerial colleagues, as he is the person who is democratically accountable and in the best position to consider issues about resources and wider policy matters. I hope that that offers some reassurance that the commissioner's voice will be sought out and listened to. However, we resist the idea of placing that on a statutory footing.

Cheryl Gillan: I appreciate what the Minister has said, and it leaves me fairly satisfied that the commissioner will be part of the consultation process even if that is not stated in the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Mrs. Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 19, in clause 22, page 15, line 9, at end insert 
', and at the same time
(c) publish the reasons why he has or has not modified the draft in the light of any such representations'.
 The amendment will help ensure that the Government make policy decisions about the victims code in an open, accountable and timely manner. Equally importantly, it will demonstrate that the Government have listened to the views of other stakeholders and the public. I am sure that it will appeal to the Minister because I know that he takes to heart the transparency of government and would wish to see it reflected in the Bill. Therefore, although he has resisted every amendment to date, I hope that he will look more favourably on this one. 
 I believe that the amendment will improve the consultation process outlined in the Bill by ensuring that the Home Secretary, in light of public consultation, publishes the reasons for policy decisions affecting the finalised version of the victims code and does so at the appropriate time. 
 The Bill sets out the process for introducing and revising the code, and it stipulates how the public should be consulted. However, it does not provide for a clear and accountable outcome to the process. The gap is significant because of the importance, widely acknowledged, of including stakeholders and members of the public at every stage of the policy-making process. The importance that the Government place on that and other areas of public involvement was clear when the Prime Minister introduced the new code of practice on consultation in January. He observed that the new guidance strengthened the commitment to providing respondents with feedback, and he noted that it was important to make consultation processes easier for people to engage with. Armed as I am with the words of the Prime Minister, I hope that the Minister will move in my direction and look even more favourably on the amendment. 
 Given that the latest good practice on consultations endorsed by the Government states that public engagement is vital and that outcomes are a key part of any consultation, adopting the amendment would demonstrate a commitment to public engagement in policy making at the key-outcome stage. Section 4 of the code of practice on consultation states that it is good practice to give 
''feedback regarding the responses received and how the consultation process influenced the policy.'' 
It directs Government Departments specifically to publish a summary of responses and stipulates that, wherever possible, that summary should include a summary of next steps for the policy, including the reasons for the decisions taken. 
 The amendment would help to guarantee that the Home Secretary will not only give due consideration to representations made to him by key stakeholders and the public, but will demonstrate a willingness to listen to the public's voice when reaching final decisions in victims policy. In other words, this is straight out of the Government's mouth—the horse's mouth—and I hope that the Minister will accept it.

David Heath: We again concur.

Paul Goggins: I suspect that the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham will, once again, be pleased and disappointed by my response. I hope that her pleasure will be sufficient to lead her to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment No. 19 specifies that the Secretary of State should publish his reasons for accepting or rejecting suggestions to amend the code as a result of public consultation. I am happy to confirm to the hon. Lady and the Committee that it is my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary's firm intention to publish his response to the consultation with stakeholders on the contents of the code. However, that will be in line with the best practice guidance issued by the Cabinet Office, rather than through an amendment to this Bill. I hope that, with that assurance, the hon. Lady will withdraw the amendment.

Cheryl Gillan: As usual, the Minister seeks to excite me and disappoints me at the last minute. I am most upset that he will not accept the amendment. I thought that it added to the Bill, and that was the view of many outside bodies, including Victim Support. I suppose that I will have to make do with the conciliatory remarks at the beginning of his response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 - Effect of non-compliance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Lady Hermon: I have a minor, technical point to make. The Minister will be able to dismiss it quickly and resolve the question in my mind.
 Given the example of the old code in Northern Ireland, I presume that the need to comply with the code of practice for victims will apply to the police. Subsection (2) says that 
''the code is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings and a court may take into account a failure to comply with the code in determining a question in the proceedings.'' 
Will a police officer's failure to comply with the code of practice for victims give rise, in England and Wales, to a complaint against them to the Police Complaints Commission? If the code were, in the fullness of time, to be extended to Northern Ireland, would a police officer's failure to comply give rise to a complaint to the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland?

Paul Goggins: In all fairness to the hon. Lady, I am looking carefully at clause 23(2), to which she refers. It does not mention the independent Police Complaints Commission. I shall seek clarification and write to the hon. Lady to confirm whether it would be admissible. My assumption is that it would be, but I do not want to commit myself in case I am wrong and mislead her.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 - Investigations by Parliamentary Commissioner

Paul Goggins: I beg to move amendment No. 73, in schedule 4, page 31, line 23, after 'by', insert 'any of these'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government amendments Nos. 74, 72, 75, 76, 77 and 83. 
 Government new clause 23—Victims of persons sentenced to imprisonment or detention. 
 Government new clause 24—Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order. 
 Government new clause 25—Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction. 
 Government new clause 26—Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction. 
 Government new clause 27—Duties of local probation boards: interpretation. 
 Government new clause 29—Victims of mentally disordered persons: Northern Ireland.

Paul Goggins: The amendments provide a right for the victims of sexual or violent offences to be consulted and to make representations about the conditions of release of offenders. That right was introduced for the victims of offences when the offender received a prison sentence under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, but there was no equivalent provision when the offender was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. Victims of offences committed by mentally disordered offenders were left in ignorance of arrangements for the return to the community of those offenders.
 The proposals remedy that deficiency. They have been the subject of wide consultation in the context of the draft Mental Health Bill when they attracted general support. They are strongly supported by groups representing the victims of offences committed by mentally disordered offenders. I stress that that does not mean that confidential medical information about offenders will be revealed. The provisions enable the victims of offences committed by mentally disordered people to be advised about arrangements for discharge and to make representations about the safeguards that they wish to see in place for their own safety and peace of mind. 
 The provisions will enable victims of mentally disordered offenders to know that the system has not abandoned them and that their legitimate concerns can be heard by those taking decisions about returning offenders to the community. Victims will feel secure that they will not one day find themselves confronting the person who caused them such harm, without having known that the person was, in fact, back in the community.

David Heath: Do the provisions apply to those who were put into custody at a court martial?

Paul Goggins: My understanding is that precisely the same rules that apply throughout the general system will also apply to courts martial. Thus, the same provisions will apply. If I am advised to the contrary—[Interruption.] It seems that my advice this time is not in my favour. When I was advised previously, the answer was that the provisions would be the same and in parallel. However, on this occasion, I have been advised that the same rules do not apply to courts martial.

David Heath: I find it helpful to have that answer, but it is not quite so helpful to the victims of a crime committed by a person who happens to be in military service. Should it not apply to people who are subjected to proceedings at courts martial?

Paul Goggins: Given that I did not readily know the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question, the least that I can do is reflect on his argument. Having thought about it, I shall certainly return to him with my conclusions. I am grateful to him.
 The new clauses incorporate existing provision in section 69 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and would add to them, so that the rights and duties are not arbitrarily removed if an offender becomes subject to powers under the Mental Health Act 1983. New clause 29 would amend the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 to require the Secretary of State to create a similar scheme for victims of mentally disordered offenders in Northern Ireland. In principle, the Northern Ireland scheme would closely mirror the England and Wales model. 
 In England and Wales, local probation boards would be tasked with providing the service to victims, while in Northern Ireland it is more appropriate that the duty should fall to the Secretary of State. I hope that the hon. Member for North Down is pleased that we shall extend the provisions. There will be small differences between Northern Ireland and England and Wales in operation and organisation, but the spirit and objective will remain the same, and I hope that the outcome will be the same. With that assurance, I hope that the Committee supports the amendment.

Cheryl Gillan: I understand entirely what the Government are attempting to do with these amendments, but I have a couple of questions that arise from their drafting and the principle that is established by the way in which the Government seek to maintain the victim's involvement if any aspect of a hospital order is invoked for the offender. I appreciate that new clauses 25 and 26 in particular cover the eventualities of an offender going to hospital and, on recovering enough, being taken to prison, and of a person being sent to prison and subsequently being transferred to hospital.
 I have a problem with new clause 24 with which the Minister may be able to help. Subsection (2) states that only one of the conditions laid out in the new clause needs to be met in respect of the offender before the new provisions bite. At subsection (2)(b), the conditions include a situation where 
''a verdict is returned that the patient is not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity''. 
If an offender has been judged to be insane, why should the victim, in this narrow instance, be consulted on the release of that individual? I could understand the victim being informed—that is reasonable, and probably desirable—but it will be a matter of fact that the decision has been reached that the offender is insane, so it will be interesting to know how the Minister envisages the consultation process taking place. It will be the doctor who reaches the conclusion that the offender can be released; it is difficult to imagine the conversation that will take place. It might go like this: the doctor says, ''It's all right. How do you feel about it?'' Without an insight from the Minister, this could be viewed as a gimmick, so I look forward to his explanation. 
 I would like to hear how these provisions—in particular, the one I have just referred to—square with human rights legislation. How can the Minister be certain that revealing the doctor's views on the mental health of the offender is not revealing medical information that would in other circumstances be treated as confidential? 
 Once again, I ask about the resource implications, particularly because the burden falls on the probation boards. What extra training and manpower have been allowed for? When will an impact assessment be prepared for the new clauses? The Minister knows only too well that with the advent of the National Offender Management Service the probation service is somewhat challenged at the moment, and is certainly under pressure right across the board, so much so that in many instances a fully trained probation officer is often not the person who interviews offenders. The implications are particularly important for the probation service. 
 Lastly, there are cross-border implications. Are there similar provisions in Scotland? What are the cross-border implications of the Government amendments and proposals? What happens if a foreign national is involved, and, having been detained under the provisions identified in new clause 24, he or she is deemed fit to leave hospital and becomes eligible for deportation? Is the involvement of victims covered in that instance? Obviously, that situation is not outwith the realms of possibility, and I am sure that the Minister is well aware of similar cases.

Paul Goggins: I was waiting for the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome to concur with the hon. Lady, but he has decided not to on this occasion.
 I shall do my best to respond to the points raised by the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham. There are several routes by which a mentally disordered offender may go from court through a period of custody and care and back into the community. Sometimes they will go to prison, sometimes to secure mental hospitals, and sometimes it will be a combination of the two. We want a standard form to apply. 
 The hon. Lady mentioned consultation with victims. I hasten to add that consultation is not the equivalent of a veto, but it is intended that the probation service—the service responsible for carrying out that work—should listen carefully to victims' legitimate concerns. As with serious offenders leaving prison, offenders leaving secure mental hospital may have conditions attached to their release—to reside in a certain place, for example. The power of consultation is designed simply to ensure that the views and legitimate concerns about when and where people might live are fully considered so that the probation service and other authorities have all the information to hand when setting such conditions. 
 I can confirm that our proposals are compatible with human rights legislation. We have made that clear throughout the Bill, and the point applies here too. We have discussed in other forums the issue of the 
 probation service. It does fantastic work under huge pressure—pressure that has been relieved to some degree by the additional £16 million that I was able to announce a few weeks ago. From the conversations that I have had on a local level and elsewhere, it seems to have been well received. 
 On cross-border issues, the probation board will, if it is appropriate, let the victim know that the offender has moved out of the jurisdiction. The case would then be dealt with under the rules of the receiving jurisdiction. Clearly, there will be a duty to communicate that information, but the offender would be dealt with under the regulations that pertain to where they reside. 
 I hope that I have been able to respond to at least most of the issues that the hon. Lady mentioned.

Cheryl Gillan: I thank the Minister for his response, but I am still not satisfied. I do not believe that he has dealt with my point about new clause 24(2)(b) and when
''a verdict is returned that the patient is not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity''. 
I had hoped that he might get further inspiration to satisfy both me and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, who is getting hot under the collar at the lack of a response. The Minister's other option is to write to us, and provided we could revisit the issue at a later stage, I would be willing to take information in the form of a letter.

Paul Goggins: That is extraordinarily helpful. I suspect that the letter may be being drafted as we speak.

Dominic Grieve: I apologise for arriving at such a late stage in the proceedings, although better late than never.
 There is an important point here. If someone has never been convicted of an offence but is detained in a mental hospital, there are some curious issues about how much information can be shared with their ''victim''—a victim in reality but not one who comes after a conviction in law—about that person's release from hospital. I would be grateful if the Minister considered the point, as there are significant, rather than dreamt-up, questions about how consultation should happen in such circumstances. I would be grateful if the Minister could answer that.

Paul Goggins: I was grateful for the offer from the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham to write to her, as I saw the hon. Member for Beaconsfield come refreshed into the Room after we had been debating these issues for some time. However, even at this stage, we may have some helpful information.
 Under clause 17, a hospital order may be made where a person is not guilty by insanity. The victim has the same interest in knowing what will happen to the perpetrator as they would have had if he had been 
 convicted. The victim will have suffered the same trauma, and we must emphasise the interests of the victim. Trying to understand the pain and difficulty that they have faced is our motivation. I hope that the hon. Lady and hon. Gentleman can regard that as a down payment on a letter to follow. 
 In the time that we have had to reflect on that matter, I have also had time to reflect on another issue that the hon. Lady raised—deportation. If a person were to be deported on his release from prison, it would be open to the probation board to tell the victim, if that was considered appropriate. Clearly, there has to be some discretion about whether that is in the interest of the victim, and the judgment must be 
 made by the probation officer concerned. I hope that that offers some reassurance to the hon. Lady on that matter; on the other point, I will write. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 74, in schedule 4, page 31, leave out lines 27 to 29 and insert— 
'(b) sections [Victims of persons sentenced to imprisonment or detention] to [Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction] of that Act (duties of local probation boards in connection with victims of sexual or violent offences).'.—[Paul Goggins.] 
 Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to. 
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at twenty-five minutes to Six o'clock till Thursday 1 July at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.